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ABSTRACT 
This Article studies regulatory strategies to address the potential systemic 
risk of hedge fund operation in financial markets. Due to the implications of 
the choice of regulatory strategies and instruments in terms of mitigating sys-
temic risk, the Article focuses on one critical aspect of hedge fund regula-
tion, namely the choice between direct regulation and indirect regulation. 
This Article defines the distinction between direct and indirect regulation, 
maps this distinction’s implications in terms of regulatory techniques and 
instruments, and analyzes the arguments for and against direct and indirect 
regulation of hedge funds. This Article argues that the indirect regulation 
of hedge funds through their counterparties and creditors is not only less 
costly but also can better address regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds and 
their potential contribution to systemic risk. The economic and organiza-
tional structure of hedge funds and their particular features in terms of the 
number and composition of their counterparties and creditors support this 
policy recommendation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Carl J. Loomis first coined the term “hedge fund” in an article from 
1966 discussing the structure and investment strategies of the investment 
vehicle that Alfred W. Jones originally created in 1949.1 Prior to the regula-
tory reforms following the global financial crisis, there was no statutory defi-
nition of hedge funds.2 Indeed, hedge funds were essentially the product of 
statutory and regulatory exemptions and negatively defined by reference to 
what they were not, rather than to what they were.3 Although searching for a 
definition that is adequately inclusive and sufficiently exclusive of all aspects 
of hedge funds seems to be a futile endeavor, a working definition is neces-
sary to study them further. As a working definition, a hedge fund is an in-
vestment vehicle that is privately organized,4 with a specific fee structure,5 
                                                                                                                         
1 Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE MAG., Apr. 1966, at 237. 
2 However, the U.S. Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (the 
Private Fund Act) introduces the concept of “private fund,” which is defined in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80b-2(a)(29) (2012). A hedge fund is a subcategory of private funds that is defined in 12 
U.S.C. § 1851(h)(2) (2012). The Private Fund Act follows the path of its predecessors and 
defines hedge funds by what they are not, rather than by what they are. Both this act and its 
counterpart in Europe, the Alternative Investment Fund Manager Directive (AIFMD), are 
criticized for failing to create a clear distinction between hedge funds and other similar funds 
such as private equity funds. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne, Private Equity and Its Regulation 
in Europe, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 559, 584 (2011); see also Jacob Rothschild, Europe 
Is Getting It Wrong on Financial Reform, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl 
/cms/s/0/f51bdb9a-4caa-11df-9977-00144feab49a.html#axzz3C9rILAgI. The SEC recently 
offered a more functional and substantive definition of hedge funds for the purposes of the 
Form PF. It defined hedge funds in terms of their performance fee, high leverage, and short 
selling. See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity 
Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Release No. IA-3308, 76 
Fed. Reg. 71127 (Nov. 16, 2011). Since the complexity and dynamics of financial institu-
tions do not lend themselves to a per genus et differentiam definition, searching for an 
all-encompassing definition which is adequately inclusive and sufficiently exclusive of each 
and every aspect of hedge funds seems to be a futile endeavor. See H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 13-16 (2d ed. 1994) (arguing that however precise a definition may be, 
there will be unavoidable borderline issues). McBarnet also argues that the laws resting 
upon definitions and criteria involving clear rules and thresholds are prone to legal 
engineering and regulatory arbitrage. Doreen McBarnet, Financial Engineering or Legal 
Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis, THE FUTURE OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 72–73 (Iain G. MacNeil & Justin O’Brien eds., 2010). 
3 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also GORDON DE 
BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 10 (2001). 
4 Hedge funds’ legal structure mainly takes the form of a limited liability partnership 
(LLP) or a limited liability company (LLC). Dan Barufaldi, Hedge Funds: Structures, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/hedge-fund/structures.asp (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2014). 
5 A typical hedge fund charges 2 percent of the net asset value under management as 
management fee and 20 percent of the profits as performance or incentive fee. Certain high-
water marks and hurdle rates may also apply. Id. 
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not widely available to the public,6 aimed at generating absolute returns ir-
respective of the market movements (alpha)7 through active trading,8 that 
makes use of a variety of trading strategies. 
Hedge funds provide several benefits to financial markets. They are 
sources of diversification9 and liquidity.10 Furthermore, by investing in “less 
liquid, more complex and hard-to-value” securities such as convertible 
bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps, hedge funds complete and 
deepen financial markets.11 More importantly, hedge funds’ focus on generat-
ing alpha (the excess return of a hedge fund relative to a benchmark return) 
is rooted in exploiting market imperfections and discrepancies,12 which 
                                                                                                                         
6 In the U.S., the recently enacted Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act directs 
the SEC to amend rule 506 of the Regulation D to remove the ban on hedge fund general 
solicitation. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (Jan. 3, 2012). However, the sale of hedge fund prod-
ucts is still restricted to accredited investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(e)(B) (2012). 
7 The excess return of a hedge fund relative to a benchmark index is called its alpha. See 
Arturo Neto, Quantitative Analysis of Hedge Funds, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia 
.com/articles/mutualfund/09/hedge-fundanalysis.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Simply put, 
the alpha shows by how much a hedge fund outperforms the markets, which can serve as 
a measurement of managerial skill. See William A. Roach, Jr., Hedge Fund Regulation: 
“What Side of the Hedges Are You on?”, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 165, 166–69, 208 (2009) 
(arguing that generation of alpha is one of the significant features of hedge funds). 
8 J.S. AIKMAN, WHEN PRIME BROKERS FAIL: THE UNHEEDED RISK TO HEDGE FUNDS, 
BANKS, AND THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 90 (2010) (highlighting the fact that investment in 
hedge funds is often illiquid and may only be redeemed intermittently). Prior to the intro-
duction of post-crisis financial regulation, the absence of a registration requirement and 
legal restraints on hedge funds’ investment strategies were among the defining features of 
hedge funds. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE 
FUNDS 13–14, 77 (2003) [hereinafter IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf; see also Houman B. 
Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor 
Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 245 (2009) (viewing the unrestrained use of invest-
ment strategies as a defining feature of a hedge fund). 
9 Wouter van Eechoud et al., Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk 
Perspective, 19 FIN. MARKETS, INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 269, 275–78 (2010); see also 
William F. Sharpe, Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement, 
18 J.  PORTFOLIO MGMT. 7, 7–19 (1992) (arguing that hedge funds provide diversification 
for professional and institutional investors); Thomas Schneeweis et al., Alternative Invest-
ments in the Institutional Portfolio 1, 2–3, 9–10 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.edge-fund.com/ScKG02.pdf. 
10 Robert J. Bianchi & Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk, 
19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 6, 13–15 (2010). 
11 Eechoud et al., supra note 9, at 275–78; Bianchi & Drew, supra note 10, at 13–15. 
12 In fact, the lack of legal restrictions on the use of financial instruments, strategies, 
and investment concentration of hedge funds enables them to use a wide range of tech-
niques to exploit market imperfections. See Hossein Nabilou, Global Governance of 
Financial Institutions and Regulatory Arbitrage: The Case of Hedge Funds 6, n.7 
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facilitates the price discovery mechanism in financial markets by eroding 
arbitrage opportunities.13 In addition, hedge funds are considered contrarian 
position takers14 in financial markets.15 The mechanisms used to lock up 
capital in hedge funds (such as gates and side-pocket arrangements)16 en-
able them to further sustain their contrarian positions.17 Such a function can 
potentially smooth market volatility and reduce the number and magnitude 
of asset price bubbles.18 Partly because of all these benefits, some argue 
that markets have become more resilient in times of distress since the 
emergence of hedge funds as major market participants.19 
                                                                                                                         
(Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Working Paper, 2013), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2323379. 
13 Some hedge funds specialized in equity market neutral or statistical arbitrage focus 
on exploiting price differences between highly similar or identical securities listed on differ-
ent exchanges. They might even attempt to exploit the price differences between individual 
stocks and their indices. In doing so, they not only make money for themselves, but also they 
increase the efficiency of the markets by eroding those price discrepancies. See AIKMAN, 
supra note 8, at 78; Andrew Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, 10 
FIN. STABILITY REV. 19, 22. (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/file 
admin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/etud2 
_0407.pdf; see also Roach, Jr., supra note 7, at 173. 
14 Contrarian position taking means taking a position contrary to that of other main-
stream financial institutions. Definition of contrarian, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft.com 
/Term?term=contrarian (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). For example, when some financial in-
stitutions are taking long positions on certain securities, the contrarians go short on them. 
15 Andrew Ang et al., Hedge Fund Leverage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 102, 103, 121 (2011). 
16 To prevent a run on hedge funds, hedge fund managers usually use gates or gate 
provisions, which are restrictions on hedge fund investors’ redemption rights that are in-
tended to limit the amount of withdrawals from the fund during a redemption period. Gate 
Provision, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gateprovision.asp (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2014). Side pocket arrangements are mechanisms to segregate parts of a 
hedge fund’s assets to be invested in illiquid and hard-to-value projects or investments. 
Side Pocket, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sidepocket.asp (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2014). The assets allocated to the side pockets cannot be redeemed unless 
the returns on the projects or investments are realized or they become liquid marketable 
securities again. Id. 
17 Crockett, supra note 13, at 22. 
18 Eechoud et al., supra note 9, at 275–78. 
19 Roger T. Cole et al., Hedge Funds, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Stability, 10 
FIN. STABILITY REV. 7, 11–12 (Apr. 2007). Although the severity of the recent financial 
crisis and the collapse of several hedge funds during the crisis shed substantial doubts on 
these claims, evidence suggests that many other hedge funds were launched to profit from 
price dislocations in securitized markets during the crisis. See, e.g., LLOYD DIXON ET AL., 
HEDGE FUNDS AND SYSTEMIC RISK 47–49 (2012). Most commentators agree that hedge 
funds provide a significant stabilizing influence by providing liquidity and spreading risk 
across a broad range of investors. See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Mustier & Alain Dubois, Risks 
and Return of Banking Activities Related to Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 85, 
88–89 (2007). 
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Despite their benefits, hedge funds can pose risks to financial systems 
and contribute to financial instability. Although their role in financial in-
stability is highly contested,20 hedge funds’ size and leverage, their inter-
connectedness with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), and the 
likelihood of hedge funds’ herding can undermine financial stability. The 
data on hedge funds’ size21 and leverage22 show that these features are far 
from being systemically important. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on 
hedge fund interconnectedness and herding23 is mixed, and it remains a 
major concern for regulators.24 
Given the potential risks that hedge funds pose to the financial system, 
this Article aims to determine which regulatory strategies can best address 
these risks with the least impairment to the benefits hedge funds offer to 
financial markets. Direct and indirect regulations are two main regulatory 
                                                                                                                         
20 Nicolas Papageorgiou & Florent Salmon, The Role of Hedge Funds in the Banking 
Crisis: Victim Or Culprit, in THE BANKING CRISIS HANDBOOK 183, 184, 199–200 (Greg 
N. Gregoriou ed., 2010). 
21 Data on hedge funds demonstrate that they are relatively modest in size compared 
with mainstream financial institutions. An estimate of the hedge fund industry’s size in 
March 2012 indicates that hedge fund industry’s assets under management (AUM) amount 
to $2.55 trillion. CITI PRIME FIN., HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY SNAPSHOT 3–4 (2012). Con-
sistent with the industry’s modest size, hedge fund liquidation had a very limited impact 
on financial markets overall. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks 
Delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets Conference: 
Hedge Funds: Creators of Risk (May 16, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm). 
22 Hedge fund leverage is significantly less than that of depository institutions, listed 
investment banks, and broker dealers. See Anurag Gupta & Bing Liang, Do Hedge Funds 
Have Enough Capital? A Value-at-Risk Approach, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 219, 236, 248 (2005). 
See also Ang et al., supra note 15, at 121. 
23 Herding happens when funds mimic other funds or financial institutions while their 
own private information or proprietary models suggest other behavior. See Christopher 
Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in Financial 
Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 724, 726, 740 (1998) (arguing that herd behavior occurs due 
to asymmetric information among traders or investors when trades are sequential. Although 
standard economic theory based on the efficient market hypothesis would claim that the 
price mechanism assures that the long-run choices are optimal and the herd behavior is 
impossible, the driving force behind herd behavior is that in an imperfect or asymmetric 
information setting, people may rationally take into account the information revealed or 
signals sent by others’ action.). 
24 Nicole M. Boyson, Christof W. Stahel & René M. Stulz, Hedge Fund Contagion 
and Liquidity Shocks, 65 J. FIN. 1789, 1814 (2010). Fung and Hsieh also found evidence 
of hedge fund herding in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis and the 
Asian Crisis; however, they could find little evidence of a systematic causal relationship be-
tween hedge funds’ behavior and deviation of market prices from economic fundamentals 
that could be attributed to the hedge fund industry. See William Fung & David A. Hsieh, 
Measuring the Market Impact of Hedge Funds, 7 J.  EMPIRICAL FIN. 1, 34–35 (2000). 
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strategies to address such a problem and balance hedge funds’ benefits and 
risks.25 
Differences of opinion about hedge fund regulation after the global fi-
nancial crisis highlighted these two strategies. On the one hand, United 
States and United Kingdom regulators, along with the hedge fund industry 
itself, supported the indirect regulation of hedge funds through regulated 
banks.26 On the other hand, regulators in continental Europe supported a 
more direct regulatory framework for hedge funds.27 The ultimate outcome 
of the clash of these two opposing views was a compromise.28 One of the 
catalysts for this compromise was the increasingly stringent attitude in the 
U.S. towards hedge fund regulation after the change of administration, that 
is, the replacement of Republicans by Democrats in 2008.29 The change of 
regulatory policy in the U.S. paved the way for at least a partial realization 
of the European views on hedge fund regulation.30 In the end, the efforts to 
rein in hedge funds culminated in the G20 London Summit in April 2009, 
at which all parties agreed that hedge funds and their advisers should be 
subject to mandatory registration and disclosure requirements.31 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. First, we intro-
duce the distinction between direct and indirect regulation. Second, we 
                                                                                                                         
25 Direct regulation involves regulatory measures focusing on the regulation of the 
industry itself as a discrete activity, targeting hedge funds’ structure, strategies, and oper-
ations. See PHOEBUS ATHANASSIOU, HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 227 (2009). It often employs registration, dis-
closure, capital requirements, and position limits as regulatory instruments. Id. In contrast, 
indirect regulation involves “market discipline-inspired regulatory measures targeting the 
creditors and counterparties of hedge funds.” Id. The key element of indirect regulation is 
the regulator’s reliance on market participants to harness market discipline. Id. Indirect regu-
lation also employs incentive-compatible economic instruments in contrast to command-
and-control regulatory instruments, which are mostly employed in direct regulation. Id. 
26 See Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, The End of Self Regulation? Hedge Funds and 
Derivatives in Global Financial Governance, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS 
OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CHANGE 74, 75–76 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, & 
Hubert Zimmerman eds., 2010). 
27 Accusations of abusive short selling by hedge funds in the time of crisis deepened 
this divergence of opinion. See Eilís Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge 
Funds and Private Equity in the EU, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 379, 389 (2011). On the 
other hand, the national elections in France and Germany, giving rise to the coalition of 
these two countries for regulating hedge funds, led to the expansion of regulatory turf of 
the EU institutions. See UK Suffers Hedge Fund Blow, FIN. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http:// 
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f583a770-5ed4-11df-af86-00144feab49a.html#axzz3Di2 RGLQ5 
(demonstrating the effectiveness of Franco-German cooperation). 
28 Ferran, supra note 27, at 390–93 (2011). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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analyze the arguments for and against direct and indirect regulation of 
hedge funds. Finally, we highlight the advantages of indirect regulation in 
addressing and mitigating the potential contribution of hedge funds to 
systemic risk. 
I. REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR 
HEDGE FUND REGULATION 
Hasty responses to financial crises often leave behind many unan-
swered, yet important, questions. Not surprisingly, this was the case in the 
post-crisis financial regulatory reforms.32 These reforms changed the over-
all landscape of the hedge fund industry and its relationship with the rest 
of the financial system, leaving many questions unanswered. One of these 
questions concerned the overarching issue of choosing the appropriate regu-
latory strategy to regulate hedge funds—that is, the choice between direct 
regulation and indirect regulation. 
Using law to create behavioral change can be done directly or indirectly. 
Direct or entity regulation involves regulatory measures focusing immedi-
ately on the regulation of the target industry as a “discrete activity or as 
part of the broader, regulated investment services universe.”33 In contrast, 
indirect regulation utilizes an intermediary to transmit the imperatives or 
commands to the (primarily intended) regulated entity or activity that is 
ultimately the target.34 Direct regulation mainly relies on the threat of law 
by using command-and-control regulatory instruments,35 whereas indirect 
                                                                                                                         
32 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1782, 1785, 1815, 1821 (2011); see also Roberta 
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
YALE L.J. 1521, 1524, 1526, 1602 (2005). 
33 ATHANASSIOU, supra note 25, at 227. 
34 Id. at 227–28, 234. 
35 Command-and-control instruments are the most traditional methods of effecting a 
behavioral change in the subjects of regulation. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18–37 (2001). A command is “an order backed by threats.” 
Id. Therefore, the non-compliance or violation of such an order triggers coercive sanc-
tions on the part of the state. Id. In this method of regulation, the law uses traditional rules 
to further certain policy objectives. Id. Some literature classifies the distinction between 
command-and-control instruments and economic instruments as imperium and dominium. 
See T. Daintith, The Techniques of Government, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 209, 
213–18 (Jowell & Oliver eds., 1994). Daintith uses the term imperium when the govern-
ment uses the command of law in pursuit of policy objectives such as setting a standard 
or rule for the behavior of intended entities and providing sanctions for non-compliance. He 
also uses the term dominium when government deploys its wealth for such purposes. Id. 
For an illustration of the distinction between imperium and dominium, see Spencer Zifcak, 
Contractualism, Democracy and Ethics, 60 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 86, 93–96 (2001). 
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regulation mostly relies on economic instruments with the aim of harness-
ing market discipline.36 
II. DIRECT REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
Direct measures targeting the entity itself impose requirements on hedge 
funds’ structure, strategies, and operations. Examples of mechanisms used 
to directly regulate hedge funds include, inter alia, mandatory registration, 
mandatory disclosure, limitations on the size or the leverage of the fund, 
and restrictions for leveraged funds (for example, capital adequacy require-
ments), remuneration restrictions, limits on liquidity management, restric-
tions on investment in securitization positions, and rules and requirements 
for valuation.37 
The primary question with respect to the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds is whether such a regulatory strategy is necessary. When regulatory 
measures such as those proposed above can be directly implemented and 
applied to the regulated entity without an intermediary, the need for indi-
rect regulation of hedge funds by using regulatory intermediaries must be 
justified.38 In order to justify such a far-fetched choice, the shortcomings of 
direct regulatory measures in addressing hedge funds’ potential systemic risks 
should be identified and a case should be made for the capacity of indirect 
regulation to counterbalance the shortcomings of direct regulatory measures. 
The most compelling argument against the direct regulation of hedge 
funds is that direct regulation focusing on these entities and imposing re-
strictions on their activities is likely to undermine hedge funds’ benefits to 
                                                                                                                         
36 The roots of the distinction between command-and-control and economic instruments 
can originally be found in the literature on legal origins. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25–31 (5th ed. 1998). La Porta et al. show that countries 
with civil and common law traditions demonstrate different regulatory styles. See Rafael 
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of 
Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 285–86, 293, 305, 326 (2008). Looking 
through the same lens, Ogus identifies the tension between two systems of economic orga-
nization within the industrialized countries, the “market system” and “collectivist system.” 
See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 15 (2004). Ogus 
mainly associates the market system with private, facilitative, and decentralized law, while 
in collectivist systems, the state encourages behavior, which would not occur in the ab-
sence of state intervention, to correct market failures and achieve collective goals. Id. See 
also Anthony Ogus, Comparing Regulatory Systems: Institutions, Processes and Legal 
Forms in Industrialised Countries, in LEADING ISSUES IN COMPETITION, REGULATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 145–49 (Paul Cook et al. ed., 2004). 
37 See generally IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 8 
(discussing a wide range of hedge fund regulations past and present). 
38 In other words, in the presence of direct regulation, how can an additional layer of 
regulators, which, in and of itself, involves an additional level of agency costs, be justified? 
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financial markets while not being effective against the negative externalities 
that hedge funds can potentially impose on the financial system. Imposing 
a disclosure requirement on hedge funds is an example of how such regu-
lations can be ineffective or even counterproductive. Although disclosure 
and transparency requirements seem necessary for harnessing market dis-
cipline,39 their imposition on hedge funds may create several unintended 
consequences. First, these requirements can lead to a false sense of protec-
tion among hedge fund investors and counterparties40 because those in-
vestors could assume that regulation has made hedge funds safer simply 
by imposing disclosure requirements on them.41 Second, the indiscrimi-
nate imposition of disclosure requirements on hedge funds can potentially 
increase strategy correlations and the risk of herd behavior by increasing 
the possibility that hedge funds and financial institutions will copy the 
strategies of other hedge funds.42 Third, imposing disclosure requirements 
may also expose hedge funds to certain market risks such as the risk of a 
short squeeze.43 
                                                                                                                         
39 For example, one of the sources of market discipline is banks. Before providing 
financing to hedge funds or engaging in derivative transactions with a hedge fund, banks 
have to perform a credit assessment. Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11–12. In doing so, banks 
employ a “scorecard approach” in which the bank rates the fund based on its “management, 
leverage, risk measurement, liquidity, and strategy.” Id. Because these assessments are 
based on the information disclosed by hedge funds, transparency can play a significant 
role in that process. Id. Without adequate transparency, it is almost impossible for a bank 
to perform such an assessment. Id. Although the evidence is mixed, it appears that there 
are some areas in which market discipline exerts itself. Id. 
40 Jón Daníelsson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 29, 30 (Apr. 2007). 
41 This effect is best explained by the placebo effect of law. The placebo effect of a 
law “manipulates individuals’ expectations regarding a risk that the law addresses.” 
Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 57 (2006). We will return to the placebo effect of law later in 
this Article. 
42 Informational cascades have long been identified as sources of volatility of mass 
behavior (herding). See Robert J. Shiller, Conversation, Information, and Herd Behavior, 
85 AM. ECON. REV. 181, 181–82 (1995). 
43 FRANÇOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK OF HEDGE FUNDS 33 (2006). In order to 
take a short position, the trader usually borrows securities from a dealer and sells them in 
the market with the expectation that price of the securities will be lower at certain point in 
the future, at which time the trader will buy them back and return them to the dealer. 
Short (or Short Position), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short.asp 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2014). By doing so, the short seller pockets the difference between 
the higher sale price and the lower purchase price at which he has bought them back and 
returned them to the dealer. However, “short squeeze” occurs when, contrary to the expec-
tations of the short sellers, the stock price of the security being shorted actually increases. 
Short Squeeze, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortsqueeze.asp (last 
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Lastly, the contribution of hedge funds to market efficiency essentially 
depends on their ability to maintain the secrecy of proprietary information 
underlying their investment strategies. Imposing the disclosure of proprie-
tary information can substantially reduce hedge funds’ investment in acquir-
ing proprietary information, which is the main venue through which they 
can exploit market imperfections and contribute to market efficiency.44 
Another instance of an unintended consequence of the direct regulation 
of hedge funds can be seen in the imposition of leverage restrictions or capi-
tal requirements on their balance sheets. The theoretically unlimited leverage 
capacity of hedge funds enables them to take contrarian positions in dis-
tressed markets, thereby smoothing the adverse effects of financial shocks. 
Due to the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements,45 in times of market dis-
tress, most financial institutions facing leverage constraints are likely to de-
leverage and possibly cause fire sales and asset price downward spirals.46 
Hedge funds, however, can step in and buy the assets. This function can miti-
gate and smooth the effects of shocks to asset prices in distressed markets,47 
but leverage requirements would most likely undermine the beneficial con-
tribution of hedge funds to the stability of financial markets. 
                                                                                                                         
visited Nov. 19, 2014). In that case, since short sellers are vulnerable to unlimited losses, 
they might rush to purchase the securities to be returned to the dealer. The very rush to pur-
chase the securities also contributes to a further increase in their price. Imposing disclo-
sure requirements on hedge fund positions will inform their competitors of their positions 
and make them strategically vulnerable to short squeeze, particularly if the short position 
is taken on securities with limited liquidity or on securities of a company with few out-
standing securities. 
44 To address these problems, Luigi Zingales proposes delayed information disclosure 
by hedge funds. He further suggests that delayed disclosure can help reduce the competitive 
costs of disclosure which can be incurred due to the positive externalities of information 
disclosure. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J.  ACCT. RES., 391, 
393 (2009). However, the pace at which hedge funds’ positions are adjusted would limit 
the usefulness of the delayed information disclosure, which renders it useless in the ex ante 
assessment of the systemic risk. 
45 Henrik Andersen, Procyclical Implications of Basel II: Can the Cyclicality of 
Capital Requirements Be Contained?, 7 J. FIN. STABILITY 138, 139, 147–48 (2011). Regu-
lation can be procyclical if it amplifies financial market fluctuations. Id. For example, risk-
based capital requirements are procyclical because they essentially require banks to increase 
their capital when their portfolio risk rises. Id. Raising the level of capital, especially in the 
downturn, can limit the supply of credit and aggravate a credit crunch, which can further 
contribute to financial instability. Id. 
46 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A 
Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343, 1345, 1355, 1364 (1992). 
47 In addition, one of the main benefits of hedge funds is the provision of liquidity in 
niche markets such as the market for exotic derivatives. Imposing leverage caps on hedge 
funds can dry up liquidity in such markets. 
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Overall, there are three primary reasons why the direct regulation of 
hedge funds may fail to achieve the intended goals: (1) direct regulation en-
courages regulatory arbitrage; (2) it creates legal placebo effects in hedge 
funds’ counterparties and investors; and (3) the one-size-fits-all measures 
typical of direct regulation cannot adequately address the wide diversity 
and heterogeneity of hedge funds and their strategies.  
A. Direct Regulation and Regulatory Arbitrage by Hedge Funds 
Direct regulation, which primarily involves rules-based regulation rest-
ing upon statutory definitions, is typically exposed to regulatory arbitrage.48 
The degree to which a firm engages in regulatory arbitrage, however, is a 
function of the private costs and benefits of regulation and the existence of 
alternative regulatory regimes available to the firm. Assuming two alternative 
regulatory regimes and zero switching costs, a firm facing marginal costs of 
a regulatory regime “A” that exceed its marginal benefits will tend to locate 
its business in jurisdiction “B” where the marginal benefits of regulation 
exceed its marginal costs.49 
To reduce the likelihood of regulatory arbitrage, an incentive-compatible 
mechanism should contain countervailing benefits offsetting the costs of 
regulation incurred by financial institutions. The most important counter-
vailing benefit for regulatory costs that can be offered to financial firms is en-
hanced reputation.50 For example, the financial institutions regulated by the 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) 
Directive in Europe can better market and sell their products if they show 
to their customers that they are UCITS-compliant. However, we will argue 
that the potential benefits from regulation are not evenly distributed across 
all types of financial institutions. Mainly because of the reputational effects 
of regulation, regulation-induced benefits are valued more by mainstream 
financial firms that deal with retail customers than by hedge funds. There-
fore, hedge fund regulation is less likely to be effective in dissuading them 
from regulatory arbitrage. 
We are going to discuss the costs and the benefits of regulatory arbitrage 
from the perspective of a typical hedge fund. We will start with definitional 
                                                                                                                         
48 Regulatory arbitrage essentially “exploits the gap between the economic substance 
of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.” See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory 
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2010). Such exploitation is possible due to the 
“legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that track the economics 
of transactions with sufficient precision.” Id. 
49 Id. at 246–47, 275–76. 
50 Id. at 265–69. 
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problems in hedge fund regulation that make the costs of regulatory arbi-
trage relatively low. Then, we will emphasize the uneven and asymmetric 
distribution of reputational benefits for hedge funds as opposed to other 
mainstream financial firms. Finally, we will analyze the overall role of 
direct regulation in encouraging regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. 
1. Definitional Problems and Regulatory Arbitrage by Hedge Funds 
For years, hedge fund regulation has been thwarted by definitional prob-
lems, the crux of which was the U.S. Circuit Court decision in Goldstein v. 
SEC.51 These definitional problems are one of the main reasons for legal 
engineering and regulatory arbitrage.52 Regulatory arbitrage essentially 
“exploits the gap between the economic substance of a transaction and its 
legal or regulatory treatment.”53 Such exploitation is made possible due to 
the “legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that 
track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision.”54 
In addition to the inherent indeterminacy in language,55 the prospective 
generalizations, which are necessary features of law,56 are another source of 
indeterminacy and vagueness in statutory definitions and subsequent inter-
pretations. Regardless of how precise and determinate a rule is, the limits of 
human foresight imply that even the least vague terms may become vague 
upon their application to a particular situation that was not predictable 
when the rule was made.57 Therefore, “a rule ... is only as good as its inter-
pretation.”58 In this sense, the choice of a particular method of interpreta-
tion in financial regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can significantly 
affect the problems arising from boundaries set out by statutory definitions 
in financial markets. 
This limited linguistic ability coupled with problems of interpretation 
breed opportunities in which the technical compliance with rules and regu-
lations can be achieved while undermining the underlying justifications on 
which the entire regulatory system or a specific law is predicated. Compli-
ance of this sort, dubbed “creative compliance,” which essentially involves 
                                                                                                                         
51 See 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
52 McBarnet, supra note 2, at 72. 
53 Fleischer, supra note 48, at 229. 
54 Id. 
55 HART, supra note 2, at 126. 
56 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214–18 (2d 
ed. 2009). 
57 JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 12–13 (1997). 
58 Id. at 13. 
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“using the law to escape legal control without actually violating legal 
rules,”59 is well documented in the regulation literature.60 
Aside from the intrinsic limited ability of legal systems to capture the 
substance and the economics of transactions, another source of regulatory 
arbitrage is associated with “legal formalism.”61 Legal formalism, not rec-
ognizing the “necessity of choice in penumbral areas of rules,”62 follows 
the letter of a rule, even if this fails to serve its purpose.63 The emphasis on 
literal interpretation and legal formalism highlights the role of definitions 
in legislation, rule-making and adjudication. Needless to say, contrary to 
the principles-based regulation the focus of which is on “goals” rather than 
“means” of achieving the goals, rules-based regulation creates vast opportu-
nities for regulatory arbitrage.64 Likewise, rules-based direct regulation of 
hedge funds along with the appeal to the literal meaning of words in adjudi-
cation and legal interpretation can be used to undermine the very purpose 
of regulation designed to address hedge funds’ externalities. 
Accordingly, the necessity for interpretation implies that regulators’ 
reliance on definitions is not necessarily helpful, and in fact can be counter-
productive. In the words of Judge Randolph, in Goldstein v. SEC, “[t]he 
lack of statutory definition of a word does not necessarily render the mean-
ing of a word ambiguous, just as the presence of a definition does not neces-
sarily make the meaning clear. A definition only pushes the problem back 
to the meaning of the defining terms.”65 Therefore, the direct regulation of 
hedge funds that cannot avoid using statutory definitions is unlikely to cope 
with regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. 
Regardless of the subjects of rules and regulations, all types of regula-
tion necessarily involve definitions and, to a certain degree, are subject to 
regulatory arbitrage. In other words, a direct regulation relying on precise 
rules and definitions spurs regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds as much as 
it encourages regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds’ counterparties and 
creditors. As we will argue in the next two Sections, however, the costs of 
regulatory arbitrage for hedge funds are substantially lower compared to 
                                                                                                                         
59 Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism 
and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848 (1991). 
60 See KAREN YEUNG, SECURING COMPLIANCE: A PRINCIPLED APPROACH 3–4 (2004). 
61 HART, supra note 2, at 129. 
62 Id. at 124–30. 
63 McBarnet and Whelan define formalism as “a narrow approach to legal control—
the use of clearly defined, highly administrable rules, an emphasis on uniformity, consis-
tency and predictability, on the legal form of transactions and relationships and on literal 
interpretation.” See McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 59, at 848–49. 
64 McBarnet, supra note 2, at 72. 
65 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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the costs for banks and mutual funds. Therefore, regulating hedge funds 
through, for instance, the banks they deal with is less likely to encourage 
regulatory arbitrage. 
Taking all the above-mentioned problems with definitions into account, 
it is not surprising to observe a consistent tendency of regulators to avoid 
engaging in definitional issues in hedge fund regulation, especially those 
concerning a hedge fund as an entity.66 The hassles in defining dynamic and 
heterogeneous entities such as hedge funds give rise to problems that make 
direct regulation difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Indeed, regula-
tory arbitrage is the main obstacle for a rules-based direct regulation of hedge 
funds. Such problems can be better addressed by using principles-based 
regulation or even indirect regulation, which, as discussed above, focuses 
on financial entities other than hedge funds themselves. 
2. Hedge Funds’ Closure Rate and Reputational Costs of 
Regulatory Arbitrage 
There are limits to regulatory arbitrage, and market forces can, to some 
extent, mitigate the effects of the regulatory race-to-the-bottom that may 
stem from such a practice.67 Indeed, a firm’s ability to arbitrage between 
                                                                                                                         
66 Entity-based approach to regulation or institutional regulation has its own proponents 
because the problem of definition is ubiquitous in the regulation of economic activities 
and is not limited to institution-based financial regulation. See Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap 
Agreements Securities or Futures?: The Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regu-
latory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379 (1999). In other 
words, definitional problems also pose almost the same challenges to the “product-based 
approach” to regulation. Id. at 416 (showing how regulation of swap agreements can escape 
regulation because there is uncertainty and complexities in defining financial products such 
as securities and futures. She concludes that, concerning swap markets, the regulatory prob-
lems such as definitional and jurisdictional problems can best be addressed by focusing 
on the “market participant-based regulation” rather than the classification of swap agree-
ments as futures or securities.). However, with respect to hedge fund regulation, most 
regulations opted for an institutional one-size-fits-all regulation for “alternative invest-
ment funds” or “private funds.” 
67 Race-to-the-bottom occurs when there are competing regulatory jurisdictions, and as 
a result of competitive pressures, the competitors subscribe to the lowest standards, per-
haps to lower compliance costs and attract more businesses to increase its tax base. See 
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 906 (1998). Such a phenomenon 
can best be explained by strategic non-cooperative interactions forming a prisoners’ dilemma 
in which every jurisdiction has a greater incentive to defect. However, as suggested above, 
competitive pressures do not necessarily result in a race-to-the-bottom. Id. at 916–17. 
Indeed, empirical evidence confirms the theory that regulatory competition will result in a 
separation between countries based on their securities regulatory system. Id. Some juris-
dictions will cater to managers seeking opportunistic behavior and some others will attract 
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regulatory regimes is constrained by its willingness to be subject to the least 
credible regulatory regime. Financial institutions’ willingness to choose a 
less credible regulatory regime is, among other things, a function of their 
investors’ and counterparties’ willingness to engage in transactions with 
financial institutions supported by a stable and reliable financial infra-
structure.68 Therefore, if because of reputational concerns the quality of 
regulation matters for financial institutions, regulatory arbitrage will occur 
only to a limited extent. 
Recent empirical studies on banks’ regulatory arbitrage find strong evi-
dence of transfer of funds by banks to less regulated markets.69 Meanwhile, 
these studies confirm that in the absence of a strong institutional infrastruc-
ture and of a legal environment supporting strong property and creditor’s 
rights, the lax regulation by itself is not sufficient to give rise to massive 
capital flows from more regulated to less regulated jurisdictions, because a 
strong banking regulation may serve as a “signal of quality and stability.”70 
These studies conclude that the relevance of the quality of financial regula-
tion mitigates the concerns for regulatory arbitrage.71 Thus, the quality of 
regulation is of crucial importance because reputation-enhancing regulation 
is less prone to regulatory arbitrage than regulation that is anti-competitive, 
such as regulation imposing interest rate ceilings on loans.72 
In addition, the importance of regulation-induced reputation for differ-
ent financial firms is asymmetric. In other words, the arguments for regu-
lation as a signal of quality may matter more to some firms, such as banks, 
than to others, such as hedge funds. There are two reasons for such a differ-
ential impact of regulation-induced reputation on firms’ regulatory arbitrage 
behavior. The first reason lies in hedge funds’ idiosyncratic nature and spe-
cial attributes. The second reason is the relative opaqueness of hedge funds. 
Reputational concerns constitute the most important consideration dis-
couraging firms from taking refuge in less credible financial jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                         
managers/issuers seeking to signal credibility and quality. Id. at 950–51. Investors and com-
panies will identify themselves accordingly by registering with those regulators. Id. In turn, 
a rational investor will discount for investing in bad quality issuers offsetting the risk of 
opportunistic behavior. Id. See also RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5, 131 (1995) (arguing that the competitive threat 
to the U.S. banking system from offshore financial centers in the US dollar deposit market 
is limited by reputational considerations). 
68 KERN ALEXANDER ET AL., GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS: THE 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 10–12 (2006). 
69 Joel F. Houston, Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory Arbitrage and International 
Bank Flows, 67 J. FIN. 1845, 1847 (2012). 
70 Id. at 1848. 
71 Id. 
72 ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 68, at 12. 
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or shifting their businesses to less regulated financial sectors within one 
jurisdiction.73 Repeated interactions are a prerequisite for the emergence 
of evolutionary cooperation based on trust and reputation.74 Limited future 
interactions, however, breed opportunistic behavior.75 In the hedge fund 
industry, limited transparency and the transient nature of hedge funds that 
arises from extraordinarily higher closure rate among them76 undermine the 
importance of regulation-induced reputation. In contrast, commercial and 
investment banks, mutual funds, and other mainstream financial institutions 
with lower closure rates often have multi-dimensional financial relationships 
with other market participants and regulators.77 The prospect of long-term 
interactions creates much stronger reputational effects for these institu-
tions, reducing their incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior. 
Unlike other financial institutions, hedge funds often have a one-
dimensional business prospect focused on the maximization of returns 
from trading.78 Therefore, they are much less constrained by long-term 
business interests. In addition, while other mainstream financial institu-
tions have limits on their portfolio concentration and should comply with 
certain portfolio diversification policies, there is no limit to hedge funds’ 
portfolio concentration.79 In the absence of such limits, hedge funds can 
take large positions in certain individual markets or even individual assets. 
Because hedge funds are active traders, they can also change these posi-
tions very quickly. The risk that they act opportunistically stems precisely 
from these circumstances.80 
In conclusion, it seems that hedge funds are less concerned about repu-
tation than their counterparties. More precisely, the importance of regulation-
induced reputation in the decision to engage in regulatory arbitrage is of less 
                                                                                                                         
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 It is estimated that the average life span of a hedge fund is forty months. Sixty per-
cent of hedge funds disappear within three years and fewer than fifteen percent of hedge 
funds last longer than six years. See Michael R. King & Philip Maier, Hedge Funds and 
Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. 
STABILITY 283, 286 (2009); see also Stephen J. Brown, William N. Goetzmann & Roger 
G. Ibbotson, Offshore Hedge Funds: Survival and Performance, 1989–95, 72 J. BUS. 91, 
91–93 (1999); Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 80, 82–84 (2005). 
77 House of Representatives of Australia, Hedge Funds, Financial Stability and Market 
Integrity 5 (June, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.rba.gov.au/publications 
/submissions/hdge-fnds-mkt-stab/pdf/hdge-fnds-mkt-stab.pdf. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
200 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:183 
concern for hedge funds than for more established and reputation-sensitive 
mainstream financial institutions, such as commercial and investment 
banks, mutual funds, and pension funds. This circumstance undermines 
the effectiveness of the direct regulation of hedge funds. 
3. Transparency, Reputational Costs, and Regulatory Arbitrage by 
Hedge Funds 
The second difference between hedge funds and other mainstream fi-
nancial institutions with respect to regulatory arbitrage is that the main-
stream firms are subject to mandatory disclosure to investors and regulators. 
Until recently, hedge funds operated under a voluntary disclosure system. 
Under a voluntary system of disclosure, regulation cannot enhance reputa-
tion and therefore cannot inhibit regulatory arbitrage. 
It is argued that even in unregulated markets, high performing firms have 
incentive to disclose in order to signal quality and differentiate themselves 
from poorly performing firms.81 However, the main obstacle to the voluntary 
provision of the optimal level of information is the problem of externalities.82 
The law and economics literature has shown that disclosure, even when 
socially optimal, may not be privately optimal.83 Similar to the problem of 
commons or “impure public goods” nature of information,84 this problem 
exists due to the externalities arising from non-excludability of information 
when it is disclosed to the market. In this context, such externalities cause 
a divergence between privately and socially optimal levels of disclosure.  
As an example, Admati and Pfleiderer show that in a model of voluntary 
disclosure by firms in financial markets, externalities arise when the firms’ 
values are correlated.85 In such a setting, the costly disclosure of one firm 
can be used for the valuation of other firms, which results in a free rider 
problem. The free rider problem refers to a situation in a public goods game 
in which some players do not pay for what they consume.86 As applied to 
the hedge fund context, the competitors of a disclosing hedge fund will 
have free access to the data disclosed by the hedge fund. This will help the 
                                                                                                                         
81 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 499–500 (1970). 
82 Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting 
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 16 (Mar. 13, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstranct=1105398. 
83 Id. 
84 OGUS, supra note 36, at 34. 
85 Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure 
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 479, 512 (2000). 
86 Id. at 500–01. 
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disclosing firm’s competitors, while the cost of disclosure is entirely borne 
by the disclosing firm.87 Free riding undermines the incentives to produce 
information in the first place. 
In such a scenario, Admati and Pfleiderer demonstrate that the amount 
of disclosure is often suboptimal and there is room for disclosure regula-
tion to improve social welfare.88 In addition, Fishman and Hagerty argue 
that mandatory disclosure is necessary in markets in which information 
about the product is relatively difficult to understand.89 Since financial 
products and services are credence goods,90 a mandatory disclosure system 
seems necessary. 
In the absence of a mandatory disclosure system for hedge funds, the 
free rider problem prevents hedge funds from signaling quality by volun-
tarily registering with a credible regulator. In such a setting, information in 
financial markets is under-provided. Consequently, the signaling effects of 
registering with reputable regulators are reduced. Since registration (and 
disclosure) involves costs that do not provide substantial benefits to hedge 
funds due to reduced signaling effects, there will be no incentive to register 
with credible regulators. Therefore, in the absence of a general system of 
mandatory disclosure, the direct regulation of hedge funds will arguably be 
short-circuited by regulatory arbitrage. 
B. Placebo Effects of Direct Regulation 
In the hedge fund industry, hedge funds’ counterparties and their in-
vestors provide most market discipline. Institutional investors have a fidu-
ciary duty to their investors to carry out due diligence when investing in 
hedge funds.91 Due diligence requires performing an initial review as well 
as ongoing monitoring and assessment of hedge funds’ risks and their ad-
herence to certain strategies, risk management policies, and internal oper-
ating controls disclosed in their private placement memoranda and other 
related documents.92 In addition, the fiduciary duties of the managers of the 
                                                                                                                         
87 Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is 
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1345–46 (1999). 
88 Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 85, at 512–13. 
89 Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure 
in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 47 (2003). 
90 Alessio M. Pacces & Roger J. Van den Bergh, An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Regulation, in “Regulation and Economics,” ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 8–9 (Alessio M. Pacces & Roger J. Van den Bergh eds., 2d ed. 2012). For 
more details about the concept of credence goods, see Philip Nelson, Information and 
Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 311–12 (1970). 
91 Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11. 
92 Id. 
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institutional investors towards their own investors require institutional in-
vestors to monitor hedge funds’ leverage. In other words, managers of the 
investment funds should protect their funds against any counterparty risk 
to their own investment funds posed by excessive leverage taking by hedge 
funds.93 These institutions can also require hedge funds to abide by certain 
industry standards regarding valuation, reporting, ethics, and risk man-
agement set by self-regulatory organizations.94 
Nevertheless, it is argued that government regulation can negatively 
affect the market discipline induced by the effective performance of the 
duty to conduct due diligence by institutional investors, because regulation 
can generate a false impression of safety for financial institutions. In other 
words, the very introduction of supposedly stability-enhancing mechanisms 
by governments may create a sense of comfort in financial institutions en-
gaging in risky financial activities with the directly regulated firm. Although 
in the literature on the direct regulation of hedge funds the change in the risk 
perception and the false impression of safety stemming from the regulation 
of hedge funds is referred to as “moral hazard,”95 such a regulation-induced 
illusion of safety can hardly be characterized as such in the absence of ef-
fective risk shifting to governments and their taxpayers.96 This behavioral 
                                                                                                                         
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 11–12. 
95 See Crockett, supra note 13, at 25; see also Barry Eichengreen & Donald Mathieson, 
Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know?, 19 INT’L MONETARY FUND, ECON. ISSUES 
(1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues19/; King & Maier, 
supra note 76, at 293–94; Danièle Nouy, Indirect Supervision of Hedge Funds, 10 FIN. 
STABILITY REV. 95, 97 (2007). Some scholars argue that even creating an international 
clearinghouse or credit registry containing information about hedge fund leverage can 
result in a moral hazard problem for lenders. See Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note 
95. Some commentators suggest that direct regulation that increases the transparency of 
counterparty exposures or trading positions is not feasible, and that it may create a moral 
hazard problem reducing overall market efficiency. See Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, 
Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: The State of the Debate 16 (Bank of Can. Discussion 
Paper, No. 2007-9, 2007), available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2007/09/discussion 
-paper-2007-9/. King and Maier argue that increased regulation may lead individual hedge 
funds to take on more risks or to invest less effort on risk management. See King & Maier, 
supra note 76, at 293–94. In their view, moral hazard of this type can increase systemic 
risk. Id. 
96 Moral hazard occurs in situations in which the costs of risk taking are borne by a party 
other than the risk taker herself, or in a situation in which the risk taker believes that the 
costs of such risks can be shifted to parties other than herself. Moral Hazard, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). Pre-
cisely defined, moral hazard is an opportunistic behavior characterized by the exploitation 
of the less informed party by an informed party through an unobserved action. Id. There-
fore, moral hazard does not involve changes in the risk perception of hedge funds by 
direct regulation. 
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effect of hedge fund regulation is therefore best described as a “placebo 
effect of law.”97 
Like medical placebo effects, laws also have placebo effects. The pla-
cebo effect of a law “manipulates individuals’ expectations regarding a risk 
that the law addresses.”98 Therefore, the introduction of new laws and regu-
lations can change the risk perception of the individuals regarding the regu-
lated activity or entity, whereas the effective impact of the laws in question 
on risk-taking is much lower and could be nil.99 The placebo effect, how-
ever, alters the welfare of the regulated individuals and firms independently 
of the real effects of law.100 Legal placebo effect can cause a convergence or 
divergence of the individuals’ perception of the probability and magnitude 
of risks with regard to the objective risk.101 “Positive placebo effect” of a 
law occurs when prior to the implementation of a law, individuals over-
estimate a risk and perceive the legislation as mitigating that risk.102 In other 
words, the law’s effect is to reduce the level of perceived risks in individ-
uals who overestimate the risks had no legislation been passed. The most 
prominent example of such an effect was documented in the aviation in-
dustry after the 9/11 attacks to the World Trade Center.103 
With respect to hedge fund direct regulation, the mere existence of a 
(direct) regulatory regime may reduce the vigilance of hedge funds’ counter-
parties who are the primary source of market discipline.104 Furthermore, the 
                                                                                                                         
97 Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 54. See also Amitai Aviram, 
Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 739–42 (2012). 
98 Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 57. 
99 Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, supra note 97, at 760. 
100 Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 56–57. The placebo effect of 
law can also provide an explanation for the demand for regulation. Indeed, such an effect 
might be a reason why even the firms that in normal times oppose regulations may, in dis-
tressed times, demand regulation to enhance trust in the system. Examples of such demand 
for regulation abound: the rise in demand for regulation after the publication of Upton 
Sinclair’s novel The Jungle, and rise in demand for new regulations after the Enron scandal 
(culminating in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) are the most prominent. See 
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Government Failure vs. Market Failure: Principles of Regulation, in 
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 13–15 (Edward 
J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010). 
101 Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law, supra note 41, at 57. 
102 See id. at 60–61 (discussing details about positive placebo effect, negative placebo 
effect, positive anti-placebo effect, and the negative anti-placebo effect of law). 
103 Immediately after the attacks, the number of flight passengers significantly plum-
meted. Id. at 55–56. On November 19, the U.S. government enacted the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (“ATSA”) to improve aviation security. Id. The ATSA was 
followed by a surge in the number of passengers. Id. 
104 See Crockett, supra note 13, at 25; Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note 95; King & 
Maier, The State of the Debate, supra note 95, at 16; LHABITANT, supra note 43, at 37–38; 
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introduction of such a direct regulation may induce hedge funds to think 
that if strategies become crowded or hazardous the supervisors will alert 
them.105 Such a false impression may result in a suboptimal investment of 
hedge funds in risk management.106 In short, the regulatory agency’s super-
vision and oversight of hedge funds may create a legal placebo effect by 
giving hedge funds’ counterparties and investors the false impression that 
these institutions are safe to invest and do business with.107 
Indirect regulation of hedge funds is less prone to creating a false illu-
sion of safety or legal placebo effect. It can mitigate the negative implications 
of the positive placebo effects that direct regulation creates in hedge funds’ 
counterparties. The key reason is that indirect regulation works by delegating 
the supervisory functions to hedge funds’ counterparties and investors.108 
By doing so, indirect regulation credibly signals to hedge funds’ counter-
parties that no regulatory agency other than the counterparties themselves 
will discipline hedge funds.109 Therefore, the indirect regulation will involve 
no risk misperceptions arising from placebo effects of the law. 
C. Heterogeneity of Hedge Funds and One-Size-Fits-All Direct Regulation 
To avoid the costs of regulation, the responsive strategies of financial 
firms to regulation have induced every “otherwise non-hedge fund invest-
ment pool” to circumvent the restrictions of regulation by complying with 
the statutory exceptions to become a “hedge fund.” Such a move to acquire 
hedge fund status and make use of statutory exemptions increased the 
heterogeneity of funds bearing the hedge fund brand name.110 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                         
THE GRP. OF THIRTY, WORKING GRP. ON FIN. REFORM, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAME-
WORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 60 (2009). 
105 King & Maier, supra note 76, at 293. 
106 Id. at 293–94. 
107 On the other hand, McVea argues that given that moral hazard problems impairing 
market discipline are “an inevitable part of any responsible regulatory regime,” concerns 
about moral hazard should not stifle all regulatory attempts to address the negative 
(systemic) externalities. Harry McVea, Hedge Funds and the New Regulatory Agenda, 27 
LEGAL STUD. 709, 737 (2007). Nevertheless, this approach implies that a necessary step 
in the introduction of every regulatory measure for hedge funds should be to take account 
its unintended consequences and provide safeguards against it. 
108 King & Maier, The State of the Debate, supra note 95, at 11. 
109 This occurs while the banks themselves are being watched by the regulators. 
110 For example, Payne criticizes the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD) for failing to adequately differentiate between hedge funds and private equity 
funds in regulating these two different types of alternative investment funds. See Payne, 
supra note 2, at 584; see also Rothschild, supra note 2. Rothschild argues that the AIFMD 
casts its regulatory net so wide that it captures other firms such as investment trusts in 
Britain. Id. 
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today the term “hedge fund” applies to many different funds with vastly 
heterogeneous investment strategies sharing only the formal compliance 
with the letter of the law. 
Given the heterogeneity of hedge fund types and their unrestricted in-
vestment strategies, one-size-fits-all solutions for such financial entities 
are not a viable option. For some hedge funds, proprietary information is 
more crucial than for others. The value of such information for hedge 
funds depends on what strategies they specialize in. Some hedge funds are 
not willing to disclose information even at the expense of foregoing more 
investments or receiving better credit terms.111 They cannot disclose in-
formation for fear that their information disclosure may strategically be 
used against them. For example, a hedge fund holding a large number of 
short positions may put itself at risk of a short squeeze112 by disclosing its 
positions.113 In addition, due to the economies of scale in information pro-
duction, information disclosure is less costly for larger hedge funds than for 
smaller ones. Therefore, the costs of information disclosure and reporting 
will be borne disproportionately. Put differently, smaller hedge funds will 
incur costs disproportionate to their size. 
Given all the above factors undermining the direct regulation of hedge 
funds, there are arguments in favor of indirect regulation, which can simply 
achieve goals that direct regulation cannot achieve. We will argue that in-
direct regulation is more appropriate in the context of hedge fund regula-
tion. The reasons for this are based on the existence of suitable surrogate 
regulators, on the resistance of the indirect regulation to regulatory arbi-
trage, and finally on the positive implications of enhanced regulatory com-
petition among “surrogate regulators” in terms of efficiency and resistance 
to regulatory capture. 
III. INDIRECT REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 
In contrast to direct regulation, which is applied directly to the hedge 
fund entity itself or to the activities immediately performed by hedge funds, 
indirect regulation includes “market discipline-inspired regulatory measures 
targeting the creditors and counterparties of hedge funds (mainly, but not 
                                                                                                                         
111 Cole et al., supra note 19, at 12. 
112 See LHABITANT supra note 46, at 33. 
113 Id. (detailing historical examples of short squeezes). Nevertheless, these arguments 
half reveal and half conceal the underlying facts about hedge funds and other regulated finan-
cial institutions. For example, if the short squeeze argument applies to hedge funds, it can also 
be applicable to other financial institutions engaging in options contracts. Although some 
financial institutions are prohibited from taking short positions through short sales, they can 
establish the same positions by purchasing put-options on the underlying securities. 
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exclusively, their prime brokers and securities brokers).”114 In other words, 
indirect regulation is based on the regulation of financial institutions that 
either provide financial services to hedge funds or are their counterparties. 
These institutions, in turn, are given the incentives to oversee hedge funds.115 
Therefore, a key element in the indirect approach is regulator’s reliance on 
market participants—namely investors, creditors, and counterparties—to 
reward well-managed hedge funds and to punish poorly managed ones.116 
Such an approach to indirect regulation can be seen as a form of delega-
tion of regulatory functions from regulatory agencies to the stakeholders of 
a given activity.117 These stakeholders play the role of surrogate regulators. 
As a consequence of such devolution, the entity assuming the regulatory 
functions, under certain conditions, takes on those regulatory functions and 
applies them to the target entity.118 Regulatory functions can be delegated to 
public interest groups (PIGs), to the firms themselves, to their industry asso-
ciations, or to the firms’ competitors.119 One example is the delegation of 
regulatory functions to Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs)120 such as 
stock exchanges, industry associations, and credit rating agencies.121 After 
                                                                                                                         
114 ATHANASSIOU, supra note 25, at 227. He further adds that: 
[t]he aim of such measures would be to enhance the counterparty risk 
management practices that financial institutions apply in their dealings 
with hedge funds and/or to impose disclosure duties on prime brokers 
and other crucial hedge fund counterparties in respect of their hedge fund 
exposures. An indirect approach could be complemented by the obliga-
tory ‘registration’ of managers of hedge funds in conjunction with the 
(voluntary) improvement, by the hedge fund industry itself, of its trans-
parency, risk management and asset valuations standards and practices.  
Id. 
115 DIXON ET AL., supra note 19, at 34, 86. 
116 Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11–12. 
117 Id. at 11. 
118 Cole et al., supra note 19, at 11. 
119 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
REGULATION DEBATE 158 (1992). 
120 Alternatively, government regulators can delegate their regulatory functions to the 
firm’s competitors. This type of regulatory delegation provides the markets with horizontal 
accountability (or market accountability). 
121 In this sense, SROs act as surrogate regulators. The examples of SROs in financial 
markets are, inter alia, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the National 
Securities Exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). Managed Funds 
Association (MFA) is an industry association and self-regulatory agency for hedge funds. 
Nevertheless, a government regulator sometimes maintains some residual rights or regulatory 
functions to monitor and take action on the activities of SROs. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, 
supra note 119, at 102–08. This type of self-regulation is often referred to as “enforced-self 
regulation.” Id. The notion of enforced-self regulation lies somewhere between voluntary 
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the recent global financial crisis and introduction of numerous heavy-
handed regulation, some hedge fund SROs are being formed “to head off fur-
ther regulatory scrutiny by drafting self-regulatory codes of best practice.”122 
Furthermore, indirect regulation can be conceived as “intermediated 
regulation,” or regulation that is primarily applied to an intermediary 
through whom the effects are channeled into the primary target of the 
regulation. With respect to hedge fund regulation, this approach implies 
the indirect regulation of hedge funds through the direct regulation of 
other market participants.123 For example, putting a cap on the leverage 
ratio or increasing the counterparty risk management standards for prime 
brokers, which are the main counterparties of hedge funds, will have the 
effect of reducing lending to hedge funds or requiring more diligence on the 
part of prime brokers dealing with their hedge fund clients.124 The introduc-
tion of Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act125 (also known as the Volcker 
Rule), prohibiting proprietary trading by banking entities and restricting 
their investment in hedge funds and private equity funds, is an example of 
such a regulatory strategy.126 
                                                                                                                         
self-regulation and direct regulation. Id. Although it is less intrusive than direct regulation, 
it is more interventionist and intrusive than the voluntary self-regulation. Id. In such a 
system, firms or their industry associations are required to make their own rules. Id. The 
government agencies afterwards ratify those rules. Id. From that point on, if there is non-
compliance with those privately-laid and publicly ratified rules, the rules will be publicly 
enforced against the firms or their associations. Id. 
122 Harry McVea, Hedge Fund Regulation, Market Discipline and the Hedge Fund 
Working Group, 4 CAP. MKT. L.J. 63, 83 (2009). Crafting self-regulation by the industry to 
shield against and probably divert the coming tides of regulation by the state seems to be a 
recursive pattern in the history of financial regulation. See ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM 
WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 81–82 (2007). 
Such a practice can indeed blunt the edge of the regulatory sword and forestall aggressive 
government intervention. See Andreas Engert, Transnational Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 
EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 329, 333–35 (2010). In addition, since without government’s ac-
tive role in the enforcement of the SROs’ rules they remain deficient, it is argued that self-
regulation can only complement government regulation and cannot substitute it. See id. 
123 See Paul M. Jonna, In Search of Market Discipline: The Case for Indirect Hedge 
Fund Regulation, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 989, 1009–10 (2008). 
124 See generally Jon Daníelsson et al., Highwaymen or Heroes: Should Hedge Funds 
Be Regulated? 1 J. FIN. STABILITY 522 (2005). 
125 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
126 The Volcker Rule is part of the post-financial crisis regulatory reforms aimed at 
addressing problems associated with hedge and private equity funds’ interconnectedness 
with Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs). Volcker Rule, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volcker-rule.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). The Volcker 
Rule accomplishes its goals by prohibiting proprietary trading and banking entities’ invest-
ments in and sponsorship of hedge funds and private equity funds. Id. These prohibitions 
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Crafting appropriate indirect regulatory mechanisms for hedge funds re-
quires identifying the financial institutions that have the most consistent, con-
tinuous, and day-to-day relationships with hedge funds. Identifying these 
institutions means identifying those equipped with sufficient knowledge and 
understanding of hedge funds and their activities in financial markets.127 
These institutions can potentially be used as “surrogate regulators” with 
regulatory functions delegated from government agencies.128  
To fully understand the indirect regulation of hedge funds through the 
most appropriate surrogate regulators, a brief overview of the prime broker-
age industry is in order. The most significant hedge fund counterparties are 
the financial institutions providing prime finance or prime brokerage ser-
vices to hedge funds.129 Prime brokerage is best defined in the SEC No-
Action Letter of 1994 as  
a system developed by full-service firms to facilitate the clearance and 
settlement of securities trades for substantial retail and institutional in-
vestors who are active market participants. Prime brokerage involves 
three distinct parties: the prime broker, the executing broker, and the 
customer. The prime broker is a registered broker-dealer that clears and 
finances the customer trades executed by one or more other registered 
broker-dealers (“executing broker”) at the behest of the customer.130  
                                                                                                                         
pursue three major objectives: (1) addressing problems arising from hedge fund intercon-
nectedness with LCFIs, (2) preventing cross-subsidization of private funds by depository 
institutions having access to government explicit and implicit guarantees, and (3) regulating 
conflicts of interest between banks, their customers, and hedge funds. See Hossein Nabilou, 
Addressing Interconnectedness of Hedge Funds with Large Complex Financial Institutions: 
Is the Volcker Rule Panacea? (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Working Paper, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2329335. 
127 In this sense, indirect regulation becomes very similar to regulation by standards, 
because it relies on decentralized knowledge. For more information about how standards 
involves utilizing such knowledge, see Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Legal Rules and Standards, 
in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE, Volume II 347, 349 (Charles K. Rowley & 
Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004). 
128 Prime brokers offer a range of services to hedge funds. Key functions include col-
lateralized financing of hedge fund exposures and execution of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives transactions, partly through prime brokers interposing themselves between hedge 
fund transactions with third parties. This role of prime brokers puts them on the top of the 
list of candidates who can take on the indirect regulation of hedge funds. See Axel A. Weber, 
Hedge Funds: A Central Bank Perspective, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 161, 166–67 (2007). 
129 Giorgio Tosetti Dardanelli, Direct or Indirect Regulation of Hedge Funds: A 
European Dilemma, 2011 EURO. J. RISK REG. 463 (2011). 
130 Prime Broker Committee Request, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 WL 808441 (Jan. 25, 
1994); see also PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, 
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT p. B-4 (1999), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/hedgfund.pdf. 
2015] HEDGE FUND REGULATION DILEMMA 209 
In other words, prime brokerage services are the services offered by prime 
brokers, who are part of major investment banks and securities firms, to 
their prime clients, such as hedge funds and other professional investors. 
These services include securities lending, repo financing, acting as custo-
dian of customers’ securities, clearing customers’ transactions, capital rais-
ing for customers, and providing seed investment for prime clients.131 Prime 
brokers also offer execution brokerage services, such as services related to 
trade execution, transition management, commission sharing arrangements, 
direct market access (DMA), and research.132 
There are three main categories of prime brokers: elite prime brokers, 
leading prime brokers (the leading prime brokers include Bank of America, 
Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Citi-
group, and others), and tertiary regional and smaller niche prime brokers.133 
The prime finance market was historically an oligopoly with major domi-
nant U.S. investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and 
Bear Stearns (now JPMorgan Chase) dominating the market.134 Although 
the prime brokers’ primary clients are hedge funds, hedge funds are not 
alone in using prime brokerage services.135 A number of other financial 
market players including private equity funds, pension funds, investment 
companies, sovereign wealth funds, and other national and multinational 
corporations constitute the broad range of prime brokers’ clients.136 
Hedge funds have at least three main relationships with Large Com-
plex Financial Institutions (LCFIs), which are engaged in offering prime 
brokerage services. An LCFI can be a hedge fund’s prime broker, its trading 
counterparty, or the owner or manager of a hedge fund.137 These three main 
roles are not mutually exclusive, and one LCFI can simultaneously under-
take all three tasks.138 As mentioned above, in the prime brokerage function, 
LCFIs offer a range of services including financial, administrative, and 
operational services.139 
                                                                                                                         
131 See AIKMAN, supra note 8, at 125–26. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 32. 
134 Jenny Anderson, U.S. Regulators Grow Alarmed Over ‘Hedge Fund Hotels’—
Business—International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2007/01/01/business/worldbusiness/01iht-Hedge.4071677.html?pagewanted=all. 
135 See AIKMAN, supra note 8, at 57. 
136 Id. 
137 The Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. imposed major limitations on the relationships 
between hedge funds and banking entities. See generally Volcker Rule, supra note 126. 
138 King & Maier, The State of the Debate, supra note 95, at 290. 
139 Their main financial service is secured lending. The range of services that prime 
brokers offer to their hedge fund clients arms them with vast knowledge of the hedge fund 
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Hedge funds are also trading counterparties of LCFIs across a full range 
of financial instruments. They participate in the primary and secondary mar-
kets for securities underwritten by LCFIs, which means that hedge funds 
and LCFIs are often exposed to similar risks arising from similar underly-
ing financial instruments.140 These common risk exposures were highlighted 
in the recent financial crisis. For example, a default by a prime broker might 
transmit the problem to hedge funds. This occurred in the collateralized debt 
obligation (CDO) markets after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a 
prime broker.141 The global financial crisis particularly highlighted the 
risks for hedge funds originating from the exposure to one prime broker, 
Lehman.142 Last, LCFIs can also be hedge fund owners and managers. 
Needless to say, the greatest concern arises when the three roles overlap and 
concentrate in one LCFI. 
Given the above institutional setting and the relationship between hedge 
funds and their prime brokers, indirect measures for regulating hedge funds 
primarily focus on the regulation of their counterparties, creditors, and 
investors, the most important of which are prime brokers. Therefore, indi-
rect regulation requires that regulations be imposed on hedge fund prime 
brokers as counterparties, rather than on the hedge funds themselves. Such 
measures include: 
 Mandatory registration, regulation and supervision of prime 
brokers and banks which provide loans to hedge funds;143 
 Prohibiting banks from managing, controlling, or sponsor-
ing hedge funds (the Volcker Rule);144 
 Limitations on the qualifications of depositaries145 and prime 
brokers; 
 Oversight of trading relations; 
 Capital adequacy requirements for prime brokers; 
 Robust internal risk management systems for prime brokers; 
                                                                                                                         
business. Again, these constant interactions with hedge funds make them the most suitable 
institution to perform the indirect regulation of hedge funds. 
140 King & Maier, supra note 76, at 291. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 290. 
143 TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVER-
SIGHT: FINAL REPORT 8–16 (2009). 
144 Eechoud et al., supra note 9, at 270–71. 
145 In contrast to an institution holding the assets pursuant to a security arrangement, a 
depositary is an institution that holds assets of a hedge fund in custody for safekeeping 
purposes. See Angus Duncan, Edmond Curtin & Marco Crosignani, Alternative Regulation: 
The Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, 6 CAP. MKT. L.J. 326, 360–61 
(2011). Therefore, a hedge fund’s depositary acts as a custodian of its assets. Id. 
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 Improving the information available in the market in which 
hedge funds operate by transforming over-the-counter (OTC) 
markets146 into centrally cleared exchanges;147 
 Devising processes to obtain relevant information for crisis 
management; 
 Wealth and sophistication requirements for hedge fund in-
vestors.148 
The most compelling argument for the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds is rooted in the fact that hedge funds’ herding behavior and counter-
party risks (giving rise to interconnectedness externalities)149 are the major 
transmission channels of systemic risk.150 And because indirect regulation 
requires focusing on the relationships of hedge funds with LCFIs, it is the 
most appropriate policy instrument to tackle the problems arising from the 
interconnectedness of hedge funds with LCFIs. The top prime brokers are 
almost all LCFIs that have exposure to hedge funds and to each other. This 
interconnectedness makes them a key channel of systemic risk contagion 
stemming from hedge funds.151 
                                                                                                                         
146 OTC financial products are non-standardized or customized products traded directly 
between two counterparties and without any exchange facilities involved in the trade. Over-
The-Counter—OTC, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/otc.asp (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2014). OTC products are contrasted with exchange-traded financial in-
struments or products, which are standardized instruments cleared through exchanges. Id. 
147 Christian Noyer, Hedge Funds: What are the Main Issues?, 10 FIN. STABILITY 
REV. 105, 109–11 (2007). 
148 There are proposals for indirect hedge fund regulation already in place. See, e.g., 
Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 37–38 (2006) 
(stating that direct regulation might be harmful). Oesterle supports indirect regulation 
through capital adequacy requirements for bank lending to hedge fund counterparties and 
the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements with respect to banks’ direct 
material exposure to hedge funds. Id. Eichengreen and Mathieson propose the idea of a 
“clearinghouse or credit registry that would assemble information from national sources.” 
Eichengreen & Mathieson, supra note 95. Cole et al. also propose that the “[b]anks should 
see both quantitative and qualitative indicators of a hedge fund’s net asset value, risk ex-
posures, and liquidity. Where this information is not forthcoming from a particular hedge 
fund, counterparties should tighten margin collateral and other credit terms.” Cole et al., 
supra note 19, at 11–12. 
149 Interconnectedness externalities originate from the failure of one firm and can 
impose costs on other financial firms not directly related to the failing firm. 
150 King & Maier, supra note 76, at 286–87. 
151 Direct exposure of hedge funds to LCFIs can arise from several types of transactions 
that can be divided into two main categories: (1) transactions where banks act as counter-
parties to hedge funds, such as unsecured lending, secured financing (including repo markets), 
prime brokerage and OTC derivatives; and (2) transactions where banks act as investors 
in hedge funds, either in their proprietary trading or in order to offer to their customers 
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The next Section argues in support of the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds. The main argument is that since the most important channels of 
propagation of systemic risk from hedge funds is through their relation-
ships with LCFIs, the indirect regulation of hedge funds through their 
counterparties is the best method to cope with this problem. Therefore, the 
most prominent advantage of the indirect regulation of hedge funds over 
direct regulation is that it focuses precisely on the financial institutions 
and channels through which hedge funds’ systemic externalities tend to 
propagate.152 Whether crafted as a form of delegated regulatory functions 
or as intermediated regulation, the indirect regulation of hedge funds has 
the following advantages over the direct regulation. 
A. Existence of Suitable “Surrogate Regulators” 
Before introducing new regulation for hedge funds, it is important for 
regulators to ask why regulation of hedge funds should be different from that 
of other financial institutions such as commercial and investment banks, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, and pension funds. The main differences 
between the hedge fund industry and other mainstream financial institutions, 
which justify differential regulatory treatment of the hedge fund industry, are 
in the number and composition of hedge funds’ financiers,153 hedge funds’ 
capital structure, and the investor liquidity in the hedge fund industry.  
First, banks have a large number of creditors (depositors) mostly with low 
amounts of deposits in the bank. Because of their number and dispersion, 
depositors lack the incentive to monitor the bank’s financial standing.154 
The pervasiveness of free riding eliminates the incentives for dispersed de-
positors to provide monitoring, because there is hardly any way in which 
small depositors can fully reap the benefits of their activities. The economic 
literature shows that in a repeated, cooperative public good game with a small 
number of players and the presence of an effective threat of punishment, 
cooperation for the provision of public goods (monitoring mechanism) is 
likely to emerge.155 As the number of players increases, however, this co-
operation will likely fail, because “as the number of participants becomes 
critically large, the individual will more and more come to treat the behavior 
                                                                                                                         
traditional or structured products indexed to hedge funds’ returns. See Nouy, supra note 
95, at 101–03. 
152 BANK OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 37 (Apr. 2007), http://www.bank 
ofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2007/fsrfull0704.pdf. 
153 Daníelsson et al., supra note 124, at 5–6. See also Cole et al. supra note 19, 11. 
154 In other words, this occurs because the depositors are rationally apathetic. 
155 See, e.g.Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods 
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000). 
2015] HEDGE FUND REGULATION DILEMMA 213 
of ‘all others’ as beyond his own possible range of influence.”156 This chill-
ing effect can result in the failure of cooperation and hence under-provision 
of monitoring functions in the financial markets by a large number of de-
positors. Therefore, in the normal course of free and unregulated financial 
markets, depositors will not provide such a monitoring mechanism. As a 
result, governments assume this monitoring function, hence the so-called 
“efficient centralization of monitoring” function in financial regulation.157 
Nonetheless, the financing schemes and conditions are entirely differ-
ent in the case of hedge funds. Hedge fund counterparties and creditors are 
strong, well-empowered and sophisticated prime brokers, and their investors 
are mainly institutional investors. Recent data suggest a rise in institutional 
investors along with a simultaneous decline in the high-net-worth individuals 
(HNWIs), who used to be the main investors in hedge funds.158 
 
 
 
By definition, these investors are in a position to impose conditions on 
loans to hedge funds (by demanding fully secured loans and even higher 
standards) and to prevent them from pursuing risky strategies with bor-
rowed money. Indeed, the constraints imposed by strong counterparties on 
                                                                                                                         
156 James M. Buchanan, Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction, 5 
ECON. INQUIRY 109, 116 (1967). According to Aristotle, “what is held in common by the 
largest number of people receives the least care.” See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 28 (C.D.C. 
Reeve trans., 1998). This shows the commons or public goods feature of market discipline 
in this setting. 
157 Engert, supra note 122, at 344. 
158 DAVID STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY 226 
(2nd ed. 2013). 
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hedge funds might very well explain the lower levels of leverage in the 
hedge fund industry compared with depository institutions.159 
In addition, the prime brokerage industry tends to be heavily concen-
trated. At the end of the year 2006, the top three dealers performing prime 
brokerage functions serviced fifty-eight percent of the assets under manage-
ment (AUM) by hedge funds.160 At the same time, the top ten dealers ser-
viced eighty-four percent of hedge funds’ AUM.161 The pie chart below 
shows that the concentration in the prime brokerage industry has remained 
almost intact after the global financial crisis. The fewer number of major 
prime brokers acting as hedge fund counterparties facilitates the mutual moni-
toring of hedge fund compliance with the standards set by prime brokers.162 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
159 Hedge fund investors are mostly institutional investors and HNWIs who are sup-
posed to be able to “fend for themselves” and are capable of monitoring hedge funds. Id. 
160 King & Maier, supra note 76, at 290–91. 
161 Id. 
162 Engert, supra note 122, at 351–54. 
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The second difference is related to the moral hazard problem. Deposit 
insurance schemes protecting banks’ depositors from losses reduce their 
incentives to monitor the financial safety and soundness of their banks. Fur-
thermore, the depositors’ trust in their banks rests partially upon the gov-
ernment’s prudential regulation. Because of the deposit insurance scheme 
and prudential regulation, the solvency of the banking system is not a con-
cern for ordinary depositors.163 This substantially reduces the risk of bank-
ing crises in the form of traditional bank runs.164 Unlike depositors in a 
bank who are generally insured by governments, hedge fund investors are 
equity holders and the entire amount of their investment is exposed to loss 
if the hedge fund goes bankrupt. Given their exposure to risk, hedge fund 
investors have a strong incentive to monitor the activities, strategies, and 
positions of hedge funds. Therefore, the capital structure of hedge funds 
ensures stronger incentives for private monitoring than that of banks.165 
The third significant difference between hedge funds and banks con-
cerns investor liquidity. Banks are traditionally engaged in maturity trans-
formation and the provision of liquidity.166 In contrast, hedge funds are not 
major maturity transformers.167 Unlike banks that take demand deposits, 
hedge funds only redeem investors’ money intermittently.168 Moreover, they 
often impose further restrictions on the investor redemptions using gates 
and side-pocket arrangements.169 Restrictions on investor redemptions en-
hance investors’ loyalty to a firm and give investors more incentives to raise 
their voices (in terms of monitoring and management) instead of just threat-
ening to exit.170 Obviously, the restriction on investment redemptions limits 
                                                                                                                         
163 Id. at 344. 
164 Indeed, what induced banking regulation was the inefficient monitoring mechanism 
by small, indifferent, diffuse, and unsophisticated depositors, themselves in need of protection. 
165 Engert, supra note 122, at 351–54. 
166 Eechoud, supra note 9, at 277. 
167 Id. 
168 Nouy, supra note 95, at 103. 
169 These mechanisms for restricting hedge funds’ investor liquidity are often used ex 
ante. See Adam Aiken, Christopher Clifford & Jesse Ellis, Discretionary Liquidity: Hedge 
Funds, Side Pockets, and Gates 1 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.financialrisksforum.com/risk2013/work/6024018.pdf. There are other discretionary 
methods of liquidity restrictions in hedge funds. Discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) 
are classified as gates and side pockets. Id. Aiken, Clifford and Ellis show that imposition 
of such restrictions by hedge fund managers to limit the feet voting in the hedge fund 
industry, and allegedly to protect hedge fund investors from themselves (by preventing fire-
sales in distressed markets), not only did not contribute to well-functioning hedge funds, 
but were also followed by continued underperformance. See id. They show that such re-
strictions further raised the costs of capital for such firms. See id. 
170 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30–35 (1970). Exit, or voting with feet, is known as 
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the ability of investors to exit171 (at least in the short run), this commits 
them to playing a more active role in monitoring the fund.172 Such redemp-
tion restrictions force hedge fund investors and partners to be actively 
involved in the monitoring of hedge funds, while the easy exit in banks, 
mutual funds, and similar investment vehicles reduces the depositors’ and 
investors’ incentives to engage in monitoring. 
In the presence of such strong, well-incentivized counterparties taking 
part in the private monitoring of hedge funds, it is easier to plug in new 
regulatory measures aimed at enhancing and harnessing the existing mech-
anisms that already discipline hedge funds. In this sense, indirect regulation 
is also practical from a regulatory perspective, because it relies on the exist-
ing institutional settings and focuses on financial institutions most of which 
are already under the supervision of banking regulators.173 
Overall, the institutional settings of the market in which hedge funds 
operate support the case for indirect regulation making use of counterparties 
as surrogate regulators. In addition, because the major risks of hedge funds 
for society lie in their interconnectedness with LCFIs—that is, the channels 
for risk transmission are through their counterparties and creditors—hedge 
funds’ investors, counterparties, and creditors are best placed to monitor the 
propagation of systemic externalities.174 
B. Indirect Regulation Is Less Likely to Result in Regulatory Capture 
Since the inception of the debate on regulation, policymakers have 
grappled with the problems of who monitors the monitor or, more specifi-
cally, who regulates the regulators.175 When an agency regulates a small 
                                                                                                                         
the “Wall Street rule” in the financial industry. Wall Street Rule, AMEX.COM, http://www 
.amex.com/servlet/AmexFnDictionary?pageid=display&titleid=6373 (last visited Nov. 19, 
2014). 
171 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
172 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 170, at 30–35. 
173 King & Maier, supra note 76, at 293–94. 
174 Jean-Pierre Roth, Highly Leveraged Institutions and Financial Stability: A Case 
for Regulation? 108 (Univ. of St. Gallen Law Sch., Law and Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 2008-18, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1138204. 
175 “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” or “who’s going to chaperone the chaperones 
themselves?”, sometimes paraphrased as: “who will guard the guardians themselves?” is 
a phrase attributed to Juvenal, the Roman poet of the late 1st and early 2nd centuries AD. 
See Holt N. Parker, Manuscripts of Juvenal and Persius, in A COMPANION TO PERSIUS AND 
JUVENAL 137 (Susanna Braund & Josiah Osgood eds., 2012). See also NOURIEL ROUBINI 
& STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 
211–19 (2010) (discussing the issue in the context of economic and financial regulation 
in chapter 9). 
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number of firms in a single industry, the likelihood of repeated interactions 
is greater than when it regulates many firms in heterogeneous economic 
sectors.176 Although repeated interactions breed cooperation, the problem 
with regulatory cooperation is that the “features of regulatory encounters 
that foster the evolution of cooperation also encourage the evolution of 
capture and corruption.”177 Moreover, “[s]olutions to the problems of cap-
ture and corruption—limiting discretion, multiple-industry rather than single-
industry agency jurisdiction, and rotating personnel—inhibit the evolution 
of cooperation.”178 
In the context of hedge funds, assigning a large number of prime brokers 
with regulatory tasks may create a less friendly environment for cooperation 
between the surrogate regulator and “regulatee”; but this will also imply less 
room for corruption. In contrast to the unitary regulatory systems or regula-
tory monopolies in which the demand for regulation is inelastic, regulatory 
arbitrage provides substitutes for regulated firms, thereby making the demand 
for regulation elastic. Such a dramatic change in the elasticity of demand 
means that if regulators cannot provide good quality regulations at com-
petitive prices, their regulatees will desert them. The increased elasticity of 
demand brings about more accountability of regulators towards their regu-
latees. Such a market or “downward accountability”179 will impose con-
straints on regulators and can guard against corruption in regulatory systems. 
That is why regulatory competition is proposed as a safeguard against reg-
ulatory capture.180 
However, the elasticity of demand for regulatory services from the regu-
lated firms is a function of the availability of alternative regulators.181 In a 
harmonized regulatory system, the demand for regulatory services will be 
                                                                                                                         
176 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 54–56. Findings by Grabosky and 
Braithwaite show that regulatory agencies that regulate “(1) smaller numbers of client 
companies; (2) a single industry rather than diverse industries; (3) where the same inspec-
tors were in regular contact with the same client companies; and (4) where the proportion 
of inspectors with a background in the regulated industry was high” are more likely to 
have a cooperative rather than prosecutorial regulatory practice. Id. at 55. The empirical 
findings in that regard confirm the theory that “the evolution of cooperation should occur 
only when regulator and the regulated firm are in a multi-period prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Repeated encounters are required for cooperation to evolve.” Id. 
177 Id. at 54. 
178 Id. (proposing tripartism as a model of a regulatory process involving public interest 
groups (PIGs) to address the problem of capture and corruption in regulatory environment, 
the study of which is beyond the scope of this Article). 
179 Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J.L. SOC’Y 38 (2000). 
180 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 119, at 54. 
181 Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory 
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1362 (2003). 
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constant (high), while in a regulatory fragmentation model, ceteris paribus, 
the demand increases with more harmonization and decreases with more 
fragmentation.182 Therefore, harmonized regulators will be less accountable, 
whereas fragmented regulators will be more accountable to their regulatees. 
In the context of financial markets and the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds, regulatory competition induced by entrusting a relatively large num-
ber of prime brokers with regulatory functions may create a less friendly 
environment for the evolution of cooperation and corruption between regu-
lators and regulatees. 
C. Indirect Regulation and Regulatory Competition Among 
Surrogate Regulators 
One of the positive side effects of regulatory competition is the peer 
pressure imposed by the competitors of incumbent regulators. The peer pres-
sure among prime brokers as surrogate regulators will not only decrease 
the likelihood of the evolution of corruption, but also will contribute to the 
efficiency of surrogate regulators. A peer review mechanism arising from 
competition can be as effective for regulators as it is for regulatees. For ex-
ample, it is argued that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been 
effective in shaping and defining international regulations against money 
laundering and terrorist financing partly because of the devolutionary nature 
of its oversight mechanism.183 In the FATF, the oversight function is dele-
gated to the regional groupings that conduct mutual valuations of other 
members’ legal and regulatory policies.184 Such a mechanism essentially con-
stitutes a peer review mechanism for assessing the group’s effectiveness in 
effectuating compliance with the FATF’s standards.185 In addition, it poten-
tially provides market benchmarks or yardsticks against which the regulatory 
oversight can be assessed between different groupings in a kind of regula-
tory tournament.186 Economic theory suggests that yardstick competition 
                                                                                                                         
182 Id. at 1362–63. 
183 ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 68, at 72. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 These competitive pressures can prove more effective than other strategies offered to 
promote regulatory efficiency and mitigate the probability of regulatory capture. Such a 
mechanism for oversight of regulators works similarly to the mechanism in labor contracts. 
In labor contracts and especially in franchise agreements, the franchisor (regulator) is not 
able (or it is not cost-justified for her) to monitor the level of effort (input) of the fran-
chisee, while the level of output is readily observable. In such a context, there are several 
ways to deal with the information asymmetry problem. “Cost-of-service” regulation and 
“lagged price adjustment” are two mechanisms proposed to address this problem. Andrei 
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can achieve more efficient outcomes in franchise agreements and labor 
contracts.187 As in the case of the FATF, yardstick competition can equally 
be applied to regulatory competition.188 
Several studies emphasize the welfare enhancing features of regulatory 
competition.189 For example, it is argued that regulatory competition be-
tween accounting standards and providing corporations with the option of 
choosing from among different regulators and reporting formats will im-
prove the efficiency of corporate governance and accounting standard-
setting and practices both domestically and internationally, and will result in 
a lower cost of capital.190 Thus, a competitive accounting regime is to be 
preferred to a monopoly regime, both domestically and internationally.191 
The result of regulatory competition between surrogate regulators for 
hedge fund regulation is that delegating regulation to counterparties of 
hedge funds decreases the likelihood of regulatory capture. In addition, such 
a delegation increases the efficiency of regulation by providing incentives 
to surrogate regulators to compete with each other. 
D. Indirect Regulation as Decentralized Regulation 
The indirect regulation of hedge funds will more closely resemble stan-
dards as opposed to rules when applied to hedge funds. The indirect regula-
tion of hedge funds can transform rules-based regulation into principles-based 
regulation when prime brokers implement it. This is to say that precise rules 
will be transformed into standards in at least three aspects. First, the appli-
cation and enforcement of rules will be more decentralized. Second, rules 
                                                                                                                         
Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319–20 (1985). 
However, both of these mechanisms can equally be inefficient. Id. 
187 Id. In a recent study, it is elaborated how incentive-based pay schemes outperform 
fixed pay and how tournament theory is less effective than piece rate in certain settings. 
See M. Ali Choudhary et al., Individual Incentives and Workers’ Contracts: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment (2012), available at http://www.webmeets.com/files/papers/res 
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188 Frank H. Easterbrook, Federalism and European Business Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 125, 127–28 (1994). Indeed, when the competition involves political agents, the 
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between governments or regulators. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The 
New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-
Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 256 (1997). 
189 For more information regarding the arguments for regulatory competition by imple-
menting competitive federalism approach, see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: 
A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). 
190 Shyam Sunder, Regulatory Competition Among Accounting Standards Within and 
Across International Boundaries, 21 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 231–32 (2002). 
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will be applied with more flexibility, allowing for more variations in detail 
and implementation. Third, rules will be applied with more discretion. 
Therefore, indirect regulation has the ability to turn rules into standards 
when applied to the primary target of regulation. 
For example, a regulatory strategy aimed at reducing hedge fund lever-
age may do so by imposing leverage restrictions on prime brokers.192 A 
cap on prime brokers’ leverage can be translated into effective but variable 
caps on hedge fund leverage. In this case, it is the prime broker that will allo-
cate the leveraged credit to hedge funds. Instead of directly putting a limit 
on hedge fund leverage, regulators delegate the allocation of leverage to 
prime brokers who are the main counterparties of hedge funds and who 
have superior knowledge of the hedge fund business. Although such a lever-
age requirement will operate as a rigid and non-discretionary rule for prime 
brokers, it will have the flexibility of standards for hedge funds. This is be-
cause prime brokers can customize the level of leverage and make loans to 
hedge funds according to their financial needs and their safety and sound-
ness goals. In turn, hedge funds that value leverage the most will apply for 
more loans, and because banks are more efficient in monitoring borrowers, 
they will have more flexibility in allocating loans on behalf of regulators. 
Because hedge funds themselves can lend to each other, such a regulatory 
cap on prime brokers’ leverage can, in essence, take the form of “leverage 
cap and trade.” In the end, such discretion will provide flexibility in the 
allocation of loans to hedge funds and result in a more efficient allocation 
of credit.193 
The principles-based regulation (PBR) approach by the organization 
formerly known as the Financial Services Authority (FSA)194 is essentially 
based on standards. One of the positive aspects of standards is that their flexi-
bility allows regulated entities to choose the specific means of achieving 
                                                                                                                         
192 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASSOC., ISDA RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
CONSULTATION PAPER ON HEDGE FUNDS, available at http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf 
/ISDArespECHFCP020809.pdf. 
193 The idea of cap and trade originally comes from environmental economics. Under 
this scheme, every company is given a voucher for production of a certain level of pollu-
tion. Cap and Trade Basics, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/clearskies/cap 
trade.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2014). If a company needs more pollution, it can buy a 
voucher to pollute from other companies that do not need to pollute. Id. However, the over-
all level of pollution should not exceed certain thresholds. Id. Although the measurement 
of leverage is not as straightforward as the measurement of pollution, the logic of the cap 
and trade scheme could be used to limit the level of the leverage of the financial system 
within its sustainable limits and also contribute to efficient allocation of leverage in the 
financial system. 
194 The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) have replaced the UK FSA. 
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general goals set by regulators, especially when regulation involves target 
and performance (or output) standards.195 Environmental standards effec-
tively demonstrate the strength of this regulatory approach. Needless to say, 
standard setting by means of target or output standards involves market 
participants’ incentives and the market discipline in crafting strategies to 
achieve the goals set by the standard-setter. Prior to the financial crisis, this 
was one of the main reasons for the FSA to support standards over rules in 
financial regulation under the guise of PBR.196 Indeed, similar to indirect 
regulation, PBR is a type of regulation by standards that delegates the 
details to lower regulatory levels.197 
The PBR approach provides certain benefits for firms in that it is flex-
ible, it facilitates innovation, and it enhances competition.198 In addition, 
there are benefits for regulators in terms of flexibility, a facilitative role in 
regulatory innovation in the methods and the types of supervision, and en-
hanced regulatory competition.199 Finally, PBR also increases the durability 
of regulation in fast-changing financial markets.200 In conclusion, all stake-
holders benefit from regulated firms improving conduct by focusing more 
on substantive compliance rather than “creative compliance.”201 
During the financial crisis, PBR came under criticism.202 Even the FSA 
itself called it a failure on the grounds that “a principles-based approach 
                                                                                                                         
195 Ogus, supra note 36, at 150–51. 
196 See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUT-
COMES THAT MATTER 6 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles 
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RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–33 (1977). Dworkin distinguishes 
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197 McBarnet, supra note 2, at 78–79. 
198 Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-Based Regulation, 3 CAP. MARKET 
L.J. 425, 426 (2008). 
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200 Id. 
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202 Hector Sants, Chief Executive Fin. Servs. Authority, Speech at Reuters Newsmakers 
Event: Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence (Mar. 12, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0312_hs.shtml). 
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does not work with individuals who have no principles.”203 However, even 
after the financial crisis, scholars suggested that the FSA and its successors 
not to abandon PBR because of crisis-induced criticisms.204 The main con-
cern is that going back to rules would result in increased legal engineering 
because “creative compliance thrives on rule-based regulation, for tight 
specific rules provide particularly solid material for legal engineers to work 
with.”205 Therefore, adherents of PBR continuously call for a “commit-
ment to principles-based regulation, accompanied by meaningful enforce-
ment and oversight.”206  
PBR provides for more flexibility with regard to the variations in details 
and implementation to achieve a particular goal. It further offers opportu-
nities for achieving more international harmonization207 and decentraliza-
tion of regulatory functions. In addition to these advantages, PBR contains 
another hidden aspect. That is, it can overcome legal engineering, which 
tries to comply with the letter of the law while escaping its purpose and 
spirit. By the same token, addressing legal and financial engineering to es-
cape the spirit of the law was the driving force behind the adoption of PBR 
by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the 1990s, “which saw it as 
an essential bastion against opportunistic legal engineering.”208 
Indeed, “principles-based regulation is seen as the only realistic re-
sponse, the only way to try to capture the spirit of the law in the face of 
constant creativity and technical challenge.”209 Indirect regulation coupled 
with PBR can be more effective in preventing regulatory arbitrage by 
hedge funds than the direct regulation based on rules. 
E. Indirect Regulation Is More Feasible and Less Costly 
We argue that indirect regulation is the preferred form of regulation for 
the hedge fund industry because it entails lower costs and it is arguably 
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204 McBarnet, supra note 2, at 78–80. See also Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial 
Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273 
(2011); Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L.J. 257 (2010). 
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Id. 
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more effective. Indirect regulation significantly reduces regulatory expenses 
and, at the same time, preserves “the necessary opaqueness of the activities 
of hedge funds” enabling them to “continue to operate … and thus, expose 
market inefficiencies.”210 We further argue that the “‘indirect supervision’ 
approach is the least intrusive and also the most effective in the short term, 
in particular at the international level.”211 
By indirectly regulating hedge funds, regulators take advantage of 
market participants’ dispersed, but superior knowledge about firms, which 
can diminish the likelihood of regulatory errors. Hence, there will be no 
need for further investment in gathering data and other necessary steps for 
regulatory intervention. These actions all require substantial investment on 
the part of governments. In addition, indirect regulation is perceived to be 
more politically feasible than direct regulation212 because it is less interven-
tionist. Therefore, overcoming political status quo bias would be easier with 
indirect regulation than with direct regulation.213 
In order to measure the effectiveness of the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds in reducing systemic risk, proxies for improvements in risk factors, 
which can potentially make hedge funds less systemically important, should 
be taken into account. Such proxies include reduced leverage, improved 
funding liquidity,214 increased disclosure, and improved counterparty risk 
management practices in the hedge fund industry. The available evidence 
suggests that on all these counts, the action by hedge funds’ counterparties 
led to significant improvements in the absence of direct regulation.215  
Hedge fund leverage has been significantly lower compared to that of 
other financial institutions. In particular, after the collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, there was evidence of a decline in 
                                                                                                                         
210 WULF ALEXANDER KAAL, HEDGE FUND REGULATION BY BANKING SUPERVISION: 
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the leverage of the hedge fund industry as a whole.216 These lower levels of 
leverage were documented especially prior to the financial crisis.217 After 
the financial crisis, hedge fund leverage remained moderate. For example, 
Ang, Gorovyy & van Inwegen’s empirical analysis of hedge fund leverage 
from December 2004 to October 2009 shows that the leverage of hedge 
funds, compared to that of investment banks and broker-dealers, is “fairly 
modest.”218 The figure below suggests a more interesting finding about the 
leverage of hedge funds, that is, it is counter-cyclical to the market leverage 
of listed financial intermediaries.219 The left-hand axis demonstrates the aver-
age gross hedge fund leverage and the right-hand axis shows the leverage of 
banks, investment banks and the finance sector. The figure suggests that prior 
to the financial crisis in mid-2007, while the leverage of regulated invest-
ment banks continually increased, hedge fund leverage decreased.220 In the 
worst period of the global financial crisis during which the investment banks’ 
leverage was at its peak, hedge funds’ leverage was at its lowest point.221 
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According to this study, gross leverage ratio for hedge funds until mid-
2007 was approximately 2.3.222 This leverage ratio decreased from 2.6 in 
June 2007 to a minimum of 1.4 in March 2009.223 In October 2009 at the 
end of the period covering the study, the authors estimate the gross lever-
age ratio across hedge funds to be 1.5. And over the whole period, the aver-
age gross leverage ratio was 2.1.224 As the above figure clearly shows, 
hedge funds’ leverage is much lower than the leverage of banks and that 
of the financial sector in general.225 Overall, the lower levels of leverage 
employed by hedge funds could partly be explained by the market disci-
pline imposed by their counterparties, creditors, investors, and the internal 
governance mechanisms embedded in the hedge fund industry.226 
As far as disclosure is concerned, market forces have increasingly put 
pressure on hedge funds to become more transparent.227 Particularly be-
cause of an increasing trend towards institutionalization of hedge funds’ 
investor base, the hedge fund industry is expected to become more trans-
parent. This is partly because institutional investors are in a better position 
to negotiate deals with hedge funds in terms of hedge fund transparency.228 
Industry associations also exert influence by issuing recommendations of 
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best practices for hedge fund transparency and encouraging hedge funds to 
comply with them.229 
As far as counterparty risk is concerned, the anecdotal evidence sug-
gests significant improvements in counterparty risk management practices 
in the aftermath of the collapse of LTCM. The collapse of Amaranth in 
2006 is a case in point.230 Although that was a large hedge fund, its collapse 
did not pose any material risks to its counterparties or the financial system 
because of better risk management techniques employed both by the hedge 
fund and its counterparties.231 
As far as funding liquidity is concerned, hedge funds can better manage 
their liquidity problems partly because they face lower regulatory restric-
tions. Using gates and side-pocket arrangements, they can impose longer re-
demption periods on their investors for purposes of liquidity management. 
Moreover, some hedge funds also started using more stable sources of fund-
ing such as issuing debt, using credit lines from banks, and raising perma-
nent capital through equity offerings.232 It is also expected that the larger 
institutional investor base will improve the liquidity management of the 
hedge fund industry.233 The impact of indirect regulation in mitigating the 
most significant concerns about systemic risk is potentially so pronounced 
that some commentators have even suggested that the indirect regulation of 
hedge funds is sufficient to cope with their contribution to systemic risk.234 
Finally, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, there was criticism 
about the limited resources available to regulators.235 Since indirect regula-
tion can result in substantial savings in the use of limited regulatory resources 
by substituting government regulators with private surrogate regulators, it 
should be preferable to direct regulation. The above arguments suggest that, 
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at least in qualitative terms, the support for the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds far exceeds the support for direct regulation. This outcome is reflected 
in the policy debate. Institutional advocates of the indirect regulation of 
hedge funds include, inter alia, the following: the Group of Seven (G7), the 
President’s Working Group (PWG), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Counterparty 
Risk Management Policy Group II (CRMPG II), the Economic and Finan-
cial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), and the European Central Bank (ECB).236 
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF AND REMEDIES FOR INDIRECT 
REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 
Commentators suggest that there are a number of problems with the 
indirect regulation of hedge funds through prime brokers,237 which may 
undermine the effectiveness of the market discipline on hedge funds. Hedge 
fund literature raises a number of problems with respect to indirect regula-
tion. However, even acknowledging these problems with indirect regula-
tion, it is unlikely that such problems would be solved by direct regulation 
of hedge funds. On the contrary, regulating prime brokers rather than the 
hedge funds themselves can still address these problems. 
A. Use of Multiple Prime Brokers by Hedge Funds 
The global financial crisis and the failures or near-failures of prime 
brokers showed that counterparty risk management through diversification 
is equally (if not more) important for hedge funds than it is for their prime 
brokers.238 Therefore, as a response to or a hedge against the counterparty 
risks arising from the failure of prime brokers, and to avoid too much ex-
posure to a single prime broker, hedge funds have diversified their prime 
brokers both domestically and internationally.239 As a result, a single prime 
broker is no longer informed of all of its hedge fund clients’ transactions. 
This means that prime brokers are no longer able to observe the entire trad-
ing activities of hedge funds and raise early red flags, where necessary. 
This increasingly diminishing knowledge of hedge fund activities and risks 
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weakens the argument in favor of delegating the regulatory functions to 
hedge funds’ prime brokers for fear that they might not be capable of ef-
fectively monitoring such activities and risks.240 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the supply of monitoring is similar to 
the supply of public goods.241 Since monitoring is costly and its benefits are 
not excludable, it is prone to free riding.242 Hence, individual firms have an 
incentive to free ride on the monitoring and due diligence efforts of other 
firms, which can lead to inadequate collective discipline among creditors.243 
This argument based on the insufficient discipline by prime brokers, 
however, does not undermine the case for indirect regulation. Rather, this 
argument shows that it is important to devise mechanisms to provide prime 
brokers with adequate incentives to monitor. 
B. Competition Among Prime Brokers and Ineffectiveness of 
Indirect Regulation 
One of the concerns about the indirect regulation of hedge funds 
through their prime brokers is that the prime brokers lack sufficient incen-
tives to carry out the regulatory functions assigned to them.244 In the prime 
finance industry, there is intense competition between prime brokers in 
attracting profitable hedge fund business.245 The prime finance industry 
tends to be oligopolistic; gaining market share in such a market structure is 
of crucial importance.246 In addition, the fact that the hedge fund industry 
itself is highly concentrated247 adds more fuel to already burning competi-
tion between prime brokers. High concentration means that prime brokers 
derive substantial returns from attracting one large hedge fund. Given 
prime brokers’ appetite for gaining market share in such an oligopolistic 
market, attracting one large hedge fund with a substantial market share is 
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crucial for their competitiveness. Consequently, prime brokers have an in-
centive to offer more favorable terms to hedge fund clients such as lower 
margin requirements, which allow for higher leverage. 
In addition, the competition between prime brokers for hedge fund busi-
ness gives hedge funds more bargaining power. This enables hedge funds to 
negotiate deals with prime brokers that foster their own interest, but are per-
haps at the expense of the public interest because such deals loosen (indirect) 
regulatory requirements and may put financial stability at risk. Larger hedge 
funds, which tend to be more systemically important, are more likely to nego-
tiate and cut better and more advantageous deals with their prime brokers 
in terms of collateral, margin rates, and haircuts. Reducing margin rates or 
haircuts implies that the prime brokers will be more exposed to the hedge 
funds’ counterparty risks.248 These increased counterparty risks make them 
ineffective enforcers of market discipline. Furthermore, prime brokers that 
have substantial investments in hedge funds may not exert any market disci-
pline on hedge funds at all. Because of their heightened exposure to hedge 
fund risk, prime brokers have an incentive to bail out the failing hedge 
funds in which they have a substantial investment for fear that their failure 
might put substantial stress on their own balance sheet. 
In short, the short-term competitive pressures between prime brokers 
could endanger the effectiveness of indirect regulation.249 Additionally, risk 
management practices are vulnerable to erosion by competitive pressures.250 
This weakens the market discipline on hedge funds. Therefore, the contri-
bution of hedge funds to systemic risk can best be achieved through gov-
ernment regulation.251 
However, government action does not necessitate direct regulatory mea-
sures. As argued before, prime brokers’ competition in regulating hedge 
funds not only diminishes the opportunities for regulatory capture among 
prime brokers, but also enhances the mechanisms of monitoring hedge 
funds.252 On the one hand, the previous discussion on regulatory capture, 
the theory of regulatory tournament, and the efficiency of regulatory compe-
tition has at least two implications for hedge fund regulation. These theories 
imply that delegating hedge fund regulation to the hedge funds’ counter-
parties not only decreases the likelihood of regulatory capture,253 but also 
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increases the efficiency of regulation, because it provides regulators with 
incentives to compete with each other. On the other hand, since several 
prime brokers will implement the indirect regulation of hedge funds, it im-
plies that hedge funds are disciplined in a decentralized fashion via rules 
initially applied to banks. 
C. Lack of Transparency in Prime Finance Industry 
The lack of transparency in the prime brokerage business originates 
from the fact that the prime brokerage business is embedded within the uni-
versal banking system.254 In other words, the operating vehicle of a prime 
broker is often a vehicle within large and complex investment banks. Under 
the universal banking system, the bank, as one legal entity, offers a full range 
of banking and non-banking financial services.255 The services offered by 
universal banks include financial intermediation, liquidity provision (market 
making), payment facilities, financial instrument trading, proprietary trad-
ing, brokerage services, advisory services, investment management, and 
insurance services.256 In other words, universal banks can engage in both 
commercial and investment banking activities. Commercial banking involves 
taking deposits and making loans.257 Although the sources of funding and 
the methods through which commercial banks make loans are diversified, 
taking deposits and making loans remains the core activity of the commer-
cial banks.258 On the contrary, investment banking involves activities such 
as underwriting (assisting firms in raising capital), advisory services, merg-
ers and acquisitions, loan restructuring, trading and brokerage services, 
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and asset management services, including both traditional and alternative 
asset management.259 
In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 created a wall between 
investment banking and commercial banking.260 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999 eventually tore down that wall, but it was hardly impenetrable 
during the period in which it was intact.261 Gramm-Leach-Bliley followed a 
period of deregulation in which commercial banks expanded their activities 
into securities underwriting.262 Indeed, at the end of the 20th century, the 
investment banks could operate with the same powers as they did in the 
beginning of the century.263 The fall of the Glass-Steagall wall started the 
period in which universal banks dominated financial markets.264 
Even if there are already substantial regulatory requirements with re-
spect to information disclosure, complexity in the intermingling of the 
prime brokerage business with other universal banking functions makes it 
difficult for regulators to trace activities falling under the ambit of prime 
brokerage.265 Furthermore, there is no mechanism for independent assess-
ment of the risks and transparency of the prime broker’s legal entity sepa-
rate from that of the bank within which it is embedded.266 Thus, there is a 
need for increased transparency requirements targeting the prime brokers 
as separate legal entities. 
D. Collateral Rehypothecation and How It Affects the Relationships 
Between Hedge Funds and Prime Brokers 
Rehypothecation occurs when an intermediary holding securities on be-
half of investors grants a security interest or encumbers those securities to 
obtain financing for itself.267 In the context of the relationship between 
hedge funds and prime brokers, rehypothecation is the reuse of hedge 
funds’ collateral by prime brokers in other transactions with other financial 
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intermediaries completely unrelated to the original transaction.268 Though 
rehypothecation provides a source of inexpensive financing for financial 
institutions,269 such a practice is believed to be dangerous for financial 
stability, particularly if one looks at how the global financial crisis mani-
fested itself—namely as withdrawals of collateral from investment banks 
such as Lehman Brothers.270 The practice of rehypothecation gives rise to 
a number of concerns, the most important of which is systemic risk. 
Systemic risk originates from uncertainty stemming from falling collat-
eral prices and potential runs on the banks by the firms whose collateral is 
being rehypothecated.271 A run by hedge funds might occur because of the 
uncertainty of prime brokerage business when they have rehypothecated 
the collateral. Unable to locate the collateral initially posted by hedge funds 
to prime brokers, hedge funds fearing or experiencing distress might sud-
denly run to close their position with their prime brokers. This may cause 
serious distress to the prime brokers. 
A second concern relates to the conflicts of interest. This concern orig-
inates from the reuse of collateral in other transactions. The possibility of 
reuse of collateral gives additional incentives for prime brokers to attract 
more hedge funds by loosening the terms of the loans (e.g., requiring lower 
margins). This behavior tends to increase systemic risk. 
Partly because of these concerns, and given the symbiotic relationship 
between hedge funds and prime brokers, delegating regulatory functions to 
prime brokers would be a mistake.272 The interests of prime brokers in at-
tracting hedge funds and collateral to be used for their own investments in 
derivatives transactions may give rise to a conflict between their delegated 
regulatory tasks with their profit maximizing strategies. In other words, the 
possibility of rehypothecation creates incentives for prime brokers to not 
apply the due diligence standards expected of them. Such conflicts of in-
terest can potentially undermine the effectiveness of the indirect regulation 
of hedge funds through prime brokers. Requiring prime brokers to limit 
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and/or disclose the reuse of the collateral posted by hedge funds can help 
mitigate such concerns. 
In addition, prior to the enactment of the U.S. Private Fund Investment 
Advisers Registration Act (title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act),273 some prime 
brokers invested in hedge funds or sponsored hedge funds themselves, a 
practice that is to a large extent prohibited under current regulations.274 
Having a substantial investment in hedge funds, the prime brokers would 
have insufficient incentives to take on regulatory functions, especially if 
implementing such monitoring functions involved putting at risk their own 
proprietary trading and investment in hedge funds. 
The above arguments cast some doubt about the effectiveness of the 
indirect regulation of hedge funds through prime brokers. However, these 
arguments cannot be viewed as supporting the direct regulation of hedge 
funds. If anything, the above arguments support more direct regulation of 
prime brokers rather than of hedge funds. 
E. Moral Hazard Spillovers Arising from Bank Regulation 
Moral hazard is a ubiquitous feature of financial regulation, specifi-
cally where such regulation is aimed at coping with problems of financial 
stability.275 The government’s attempts to preserve financial stability often 
requires the provision of some sort of safety net for systemically important 
financial institutions.276 However, this safety net will give financial institu-
tions the impression that the government will bear the consequences of their 
risk taking. This side effect of the safety net encourages regulated entities 
to engage in opportunistic behavior.277 
Implicit and explicit government guarantees offered to banks can create 
moral hazard. Such a problem in turn encourages excessive risk taking by 
giant banks that are too-big-to-fail. This problem may not be limited to the 
banks themselves. In turn, it can be transmitted to other less regulated parts 
of the financial system as those banks transact with hedge funds and private 
equity funds.278 For a long time, there were fears by central bankers that 
banks that take risks in the derivatives markets would essentially exploit their 
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unique access to deposit insurance and discounted Federal Reserve funds.279 
By the same token, a bank’s investment in a hedge fund might be similarly 
exploitive in that such investment would also be backed by the FDIC and 
the Fed. Moral hazard problems can also occur when hedge funds are sub-
ject to indirect regulation. For instance, banks’ and elite prime brokers’ reli-
ance on bailouts may affect their counterparty credit risk management and 
induce them to take suboptimal care in dealing with hedge funds.280 
In addition, some prime brokers function as hedge fund “hotels”, mean-
ing that hedge funds are embedded within them.281 Such an institutional 
setting can result in compromised risk management incentives in the rela-
tionship between hedge funds and prime brokers. Moreover, this arrange-
ment can cause reputational damage to the prime broker when a hedge fund 
operating within a certain prime brokerage firm fails. For example, prior 
to the recent financial crisis, the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in 
the spring of 2007 imposed substantial losses to the parent company, which 
was a systemically important investment bank.282 In that case, the collapse 
of hedge funds did not pose a substantial credit risk to Bear Stearns.283 
However, Bear Stearns bailed them out due to reputational concerns that 
the failure of such entities could raise concerns about the safety and sound-
ness of the firm itself.284 The bailout highlighted concerns about the indirect 
subsidization of hedge funds by taxpayers through the parent organization’s 
access to the Federal Reserve discount window and implicit guarantee of a 
bailout of a too-big-to-fail parent company. Such an opportunity for ex-
cessive risk taking means that hedge funds managers do not bear the entire 
costs and consequences of their risk taking.285 
Although this argument seems to question the benefits of indirect regu-
lation, it is in fact another argument for regulating prime brokers rather than 
hedge funds themselves. To address such a problem, the Dodd-Frank Act 
limits the banking entities’ investment in, and sponsorship of, hedge funds 
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through the Volcker Rule.286 Indeed, the Volcker Rule limits banking 
entities’ ability to invest the taxpayer-subsidized capital in hedge funds.287 
Under this rule, it will be very unlikely for hedge funds to be again bailed 
out by those subsidized banks.288 
F. Costs of Indirect Regulation for the Intermediated Regulators 
There are certain factors undermining the effectiveness of the indirect 
regulation of hedge funds through their prime brokers, which are described 
in the arguments above. However, given the costs and impediments asso-
ciated with direct regulation, it makes more sense to enhance and harness 
the market discipline already in place for hedge funds rather than to regu-
late them directly. In fact, the latter strategy is prone to circumvention by 
hedge funds. 
However, one of the neglected features in the majority of the proposals 
for indirect regulation is the additional cost that the indirect regulation im-
poses on the entity transmitting the effects of regulation. In deciding how 
to allocate the costs of regulation, however, prime brokers can afford such 
costs better than hedge funds, because they are already regulated and have 
the infrastructure (such as compliance offices) to deal with new regulatory 
requirements. In addition, economies of scale in compliance costs suggest 
that larger firms are better positioned to absorb such costs. Hedge funds are 
relatively small in size, which eliminates the economies of scale in compli-
ance costs. Moreover, they are transient in nature, which makes substantial 
investments in compliance unthinkable. Therefore, direct regulation of 
hedge funds would impose compliance costs that may discourage the hedge 
fund business altogether.289 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article we have argued that the choice between the direct and in-
direct regulation of hedge funds should be based on the relative effectiveness 
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of direct and indirect regulation in addressing hedge funds’ contribution to 
systemic risk at the lowest cost. The proxies for measuring the effectiveness 
of indirect regulation in mitigating potential systemic risks of hedge funds 
such as reduced leverage, improved transparency, counterparty risk manage-
ment, and funding liquidity suggest that indirect regulation could have a sig-
nificant impact. In fact, the effectiveness of indirect regulation is potentially 
so great that it could be sufficient to cope with the systemic risk generated by 
hedge funds. On the contrary, direct regulation is unlikely to address hedge 
funds’ contribution to systemic risk without jeopardizing their benefits to 
financial markets. In addition, the greatest obstacle to the success of direct 
regulation remains regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds. 
There are, however, arguments against the indirect regulation of hedge 
funds that we have reviewed in this Article. These arguments suggest that 
even if indirect regulation were effective, it would be far from sufficient to 
cope with systemic risk. Most critiques of indirect regulation focus on its 
potential shortcomings. However, we argue that mere problems with indi-
rect regulation do not necessarily imply that direct regulation is the better 
regulatory alternative. In our view, the counterarguments for the effective-
ness of indirect regulation imply that there is a need for direct regulation 
of hedge funds’ counterparties (not hedge funds themselves) in order to 
enhance market discipline. Needless to say, direct regulation of counter-
parties, particularly prime brokers, is the essence of the indirect regulation 
model being advocated in this Article. 
In this Article we argue for the indirect regulation of hedge funds. In 
this model of regulation, “surrogate regulators” such as investors, counter-
parties, creditors, rating agencies, and hedge fund professional associations 
can play a role and reinforce the market discipline in addition to govern-
ment agencies. From this perspective, the introduction of the Volcker Rule 
in the Dodd-Frank Act as an indirect measure for regulating hedge funds is 
a positive move towards addressing the potential contribution of hedge 
funds to financial instability. 
